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NOTES
FIRE AND BROWNSTONE: HISTORIC
PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTIES
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The application of historic preservation ordinances to property
owned by religious organizations has sparked a First Amendment
furor.' Churches are incensed about what they consider an unwar-
ranted governmental encroachment upon their constitutional right
to the free exercise of religion. 2 Meanwhile, preservationists are
fighting to save what they see as the United States' cultural heritage
from religious leaders acting like "Donald Trump in clerical col-
lars."
The need for historic preservation has become increasingly
clear. Of the structures listed by the federal government in the 1933
Historic American Buildings Survey, over half have been destroyed. 4
The nation has responded slowly, but over the past fifty years every
state and hundreds of municipalities have enacted some form • of
preservation-related law. 5 The conflict over these laws lies in*,.the
fact that landmark designation of property inevitably results in some
curtailment of an owner's options as to how to use his or-her
' The relevant clauses of the First Amendment state that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. 1. The Free Exercise Clause was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); the Establishment Clause,
was made applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 15 (1947).
2 See George W. Cornell, "Latzdmarking" of Churches Outrages Clergy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1986, § 2, at 4. The term "church" will be used generically in this note, and may be read to
mean a house of worship of any faith unless referring to a specific organization or property.
3 Iver Peterson, Battle Looms on Landmarked Churches, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, § 10, at
12:
4 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108 n.2 (1978).
"14. at107.
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property. 6 When the property owner is a religious organization,
specific First Amendment concerns regarding the free exercise of
religion and the ban on governmental "establishment" of religion
arise.?
The status of the law regarding Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause violations in the application of historic preservation
ordinances to religious properties is unclear. 8 In 1990, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court ruled that a Seattle preservation ordinance
violated a church's First Amendment rights. 9 Later the same year,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
New York City landmarks law did not infringe on either the Free
Exercise or the Establishment Clauses when applied to the property
of a Manhattan church.'° Adding further confusion is the question
of whether courts should evaluate landmark designation of the
interior of churches differently from such designation of the exte-
rior."
This note examines the constitutional issues presented by his-
toric preservation laws, with particular reference to  the First
Amendment problems raised by application of such ordinances to
churches. The focus is on local ordinances, as these are the measures
most under fire. Section I outlines the basic structure and goals of
historic preservation legislation, and traces the evolution of case law
6
 See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. The Supreme Court rejected a Fifth Amendment
attack on a historic preservation ordinance in Penn Central, where the Supreme Court upheld
the New York city landmark designation of Grand Central Terminal against challenges of
taking without just compensation and denial of due process. See infra notes 45-62 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Penn Central.
T Usually, churches also assert a Fifth Amendment claim for governmental taking
without just compensation, arguing that landmark ordinances "steal [their] property." See
Carlos Sadovi, Churches Bear Landmark Burden, CHRISTIAN SO. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1989 at 8.
9
 For commentary regarding this issue, see generally Robert L. Crewdson, Ministry and
Mortar: Historic Preservation and the First Amendment After Barwick, 33 WASH. U. J. Uaa.
CONTEMP. L. 137 (1988); Elizabeth Cameron Richardson, Note, Applying Historic Preservation
Ordinahces to Church Property: Protecting the Past and Preserving the Constitution, 63 N.C. L. REV.
404 (1985); Stephen M. Watson, Comment, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation
Statutes, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (1982).
9
 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Wash. 1990), vacated,
1 1 1 S. Ct. 1097 (1991). See infra notes 303-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this case. The United States Supreme Court has vacated this decision and remanded it to
the Washington Supreme Court. The Court has directed the Washington court to reconsider
the case in light of the holding in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
'° St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351, 356 n.4 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 1 1 l S. Ct. 1103 (1991). See infra notes 263-302 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this case.
" See infra notes 333-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
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establishing the standards by which the validity of preservation
ordinances is measured." Section II examines Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, in-
cluding a recent - case that marks a departure from previous free
exercise jurisprudence." Section II also discusses case law applica-
tions of the First Amendment standards in a land use context."
Section HI details four recent cases involving free exercise chal-
lenges to historic preservation ordinances by religious organizations,
illustrating the unsettled status of this area of the law." Section IV
briefly analyzes First Amendment doctrine and its impact on the
efforts to preserve historic religious properties." Section IV then
critiques, in light of the various free exercise criteria, the judicial
analysis of three recent cases involving First Amendment challenges
to historic preservation ordinances, and suggests that the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise Clause standards, past and present, are not
the most appropriate judicial tests for evaluating the impact of
landmark laws on religious freedom. 17
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW
The historic preservation movement in the United States orig-
inated in the mid-nineteenth century, but generally was limited to
efforts to save specific, well-known properties." Recognition of the
need to preserve entire historic districts provided the first impetus
for moving beyond the private purchase and maintenance of his-
toric properties to the establishment of local ordinances.° This step
required government intervention and laid the groundwork for
See infra notes 18-82 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 84-200 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 202-49 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 250-367 and accompanying text.
I° See infra notes 368-416 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 417-86 and accompanying text.
' Christopher J. Duerksen & David Bonderman, Preservation Law: Where It's Been, Where
It's Going, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1 (Christopher J. Duerksen ed.,
1983). The homes of famous people, such as George Washington's Mt. Vernon and Thomas
Jefferson's Monticello, were the initial targets of preservationists. RICHARD J. RODDEWIG,
PREPARING A HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCE 1 (1983).
k" Christopher J. Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRE-
SERVATION LAW, supra note 18, at 29 n. l. Although there have been some differences in the
treatment of individually landmarked properties versus those protected in historic districts,
the distinction is not generally of "overriding legal significance." Id. But see infra note 65 for
a discussion of the Maher test, a takings standard that has been applied with particular
reference to sites located within a historic district.
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modern preservation efforts." The preservation movement today
is an influential force, having expanded dramatically in the last
three decades as more people have become aware of the potential
destruction of many historic properties. 2 ' The goals of historic pre-
servation have evolved and expanded also, driven by the realization
that preservation programs often serve purposes, such as protecting
the livability of neighborhoods, that accomplish more than the mere
maintenance of physical structures. 22
A comprehensive system of legislation has been set up at the
federal, state and local levels to give effect to the national drive for
preservation. 23
 The primary state contribution to the preservation
movement has been the delegation of power, through enabling
legislation, to local governments to preserve historic properties. 24 It
is in municipal landmark ordinances, through their ability to set
specific standards and criteria based on local needs and idiosyncra-
sies, that real power to protect historic buildings rests. 25 Under
2°
 Recognition of the attributes of historic properties other than their specific history,
such as aesthetic and architectural qualities, led to an expansion of historic preservation
efforts and eventually local preservation ordinances. The first such ordinance in the United
States was enacted in Charleston, South Carolina in 1931. RODDEWIG, supra note 18, at I.
21 James Biddle, Historic Preservation: The Citizens' Quiet Revolution, 8 CONN. L. Rev. 202,
202 (1976). From 1966 to 1975 the number of organizations participating in historic preser-
vation work had increased from 2,500 to more than 6,000, and the number of municipal
preservation commissions had increased from 100 to more than 450. Id. at 202-03. By 1983,
this number had grown to between 800 and 1,000. RODDEWIG, supra note 18, at 1.
22 See Robert E. Stipe, Why Preserve?, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 211, 211-13 (1980). The author
eloquently describes the rationale for historic preservation, concluding that the goal is not
just to "sav[el architectural artifacts," but to "conserve urban neighborhoods for human
purposes." Id.
23 See, e.g., Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. HI 431-433 (1988); Historic Sites, Buildings
and Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. HI 461-467 (1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40C, Ili 1-17 (1986);
1975 Mass. Acts 772; CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, § 21-62 to 21-95 (1987). The
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. 470 (1982), is the primary federal
historic preservation law. Duerksen & Bonderman, Preservation Law: Where Its Been, Where
It's Going, supra note 18, at 10. The National Historic Preservation Act established supervision
of state and local preservation programs and provided for financial incentives for preserva-
tion. See 16 U.S.C. 470a(b)—(c) (1982). The act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to maintain the National Register of Historic Places, an official list of national landmarks. Id.
470a(a)(1)(A). One of the most significant features of the National Register is the favorable
tax treatment listed owners are entitled to receive. See 26 U.S.C. 4 98(g) (1988). For com-
mentary concerning historic preservation law, see generally Nicolas A. Robinson, Historic
Preservation Law: The Metes and Bounds of a New Field, I PACE L. Rev. 511 (1981).
24 Michael Mantell, State Preservation Law, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION
LAw, supra note 18, at 130. Other measures that have been variously adopted by different
states have included the establishment of state agencies with preservation responsibilities,
state historical registers, environmental protection acts and state constitutional amendments.
Id.
22 Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 29.
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typical enabling legislation, municipal governments establish land-
marks commissions. 26 These commissions' powers include the des-
ignation of historic buildings as protected landmarks and the reg-
ulation of any proposed alterations to these structures. 27 The
ordinance generally will specify the purposes for which it is enacted,
usually citing educational, cultural, aesthetic, social or economic
reasons.28 The ordinance will also detail the various powers granted
to the landmarks commission and the administrative procedures
under which the commission will operate. 29
A typical preservation ordinance requires the landmarks com-
mission to follow specific guidelines in deciding upon landmark
status for historic properties, to conduct an investigation and pro-
duce a report concerning any building considered for landmark
status, and to hold public hearings on a proposed designation."
The criteria for designation vary considerably according to locale,
but the aesthetic, historical and cultural significance of the structure
are factors that are almost universally considered. 3 ' The commission
generally is required to set up certain procedures by which the
owner of a landmarked property may apply later for permission to
make alterations to the structure." The commission has authority
to grant permission to make alterations to a landmark property,
under guidelines set forth in the ordinance, to a particular owner
by issuing a certificate of appropriateness (or exemption)." Stan-
dards similar to those for reviewing the original designation of a
landmark usually exist for the review of a request to make altera-
tions." Most statutes now contain a provision permitting an owner
3" Mantel', State Preservation Law, supra note 24, at 129-30.
Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 70; see also Stephen N. Dennis,
Recommended Model Provisions for a Preservation Ordinance, with Annotations, in A HANDBOOK ON
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW, supra note 18, A5—Al27. This latter article uses excerpts from
preservation ordinances throughout the U.S. to illustrate various ways of constructing a local
ordinance.
23 Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 63-64; see, e,g„ 1975 Mass. Acts
772, I 1 (describing the purposes of the ordinance).
29 In addition to municipal ordinances, state statutes may also detail these powers. See,
e.g., 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 3-11. This statute created the Boston Landmarks Commission.
See id.
3° E.g., 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 3-9. See RODDEWIG, supra note 18, at 7, listing ten
components to be found in most preservation ordinances.
31 See RODDEWIG, supra note 18, at 7.
32 E.g., 1975 Mass. Acts 772, § 3-9.
33 See, e.g., 1975 Mass. Acts, H 5-8. The titles of the specific certificates and their exact
functions will vary slightly according to jurisdiction.
'4 Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 101.
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of landmarked property to apply for an exemption based on eco-
nomic or physical hardship. 35 Exemption 'under this provision gen-
.erally is granted when the owner is unable to make a reasonable
use of or return on the property. 36
Commentators have likened historic preservation ordinances to
a form of zoning, a land use control that has been subject to nu-
merous Fifth Amendment Takings Clause challenges." Not sur-
prisingly, preservation laws have been attacked on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds as well, and courts have applied the established
standards of zoning cases similarly in preservation cases." The de-
velopment of these standards, therefore, is important for under-
standing First Amendment challenges to historic preservation laws,
as some courts' analyses of takings and free exercise claims have
had overlapping components."
Courts have often viewed historic preservation sympathetically,
recognizing that a national interest exists in preserving historically
significant buildings and districts, and that historic preservation
promotes the public welfare." The most frequent basis upon which
35 Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 104; see also RODDEWIG, supra note
18, at 25 ("If a landmark commission does not consider economic hardship. a court may").
See generally David M. Stewart, Note, Constitutional Standards for Hardship Relief for Non-profit
Landowners under New York City's Historic Preservation Law, 21 Cotum. J.L. & Soc. Pawls. 163
(1988).
" RODDEWIG, supra note 18, at 25. The economic hardship provision is responsive to
the analysis of the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, where
the Court stated that the New York City landmark law had not effected a "taking" of Grand
Central Terminal because the law did not interfere with present uses and allowed the owner
to realize a reasonable return on its property. 438 U.S. 104, 137-38 (1978). Justice Rehnquist
dissented, stating that a taking does not become non-compensable because the government
allows the owner to make "reasonable" use of its property. Id. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this case.
The hardship provision of a landmark taw usually is designed to facilitate compromise in
situations where an ordinance might be unconstitutional as applied.
s' Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 30. For commentary concerning
takings issues in a historic preservation context, see generally Faith L. Kalman, Note, Pre-
serving the Past: Historic Preservation Regulations and the Taking Clause, 34 WASH. U. J. U1111. &
CorfrEstp. L. 297 (1988).
w See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 938 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
" See, e.g., Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 192 (N.Y.
1986).
" See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Mass. 1955)
(advisory opinion approving proposed legislation authorizing the establishment of a historic
districts commission for the town of Nantucket and certain historic districts there); Opinion
of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563, 567-69 (Mass. 1955) (advisory opinion ap-
proving proposed legislation authorizing the establishment of a historic district for the Beacon
Hill section of Boston). Challenges to landmark designation laws are not a recent develop-
ment, but they have become more numerous as preservation efforts have increased. For an
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property owners have challenged landmark legislation has been the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" The Takings Clause
prohibits excessive public use or interference with private property
without just compensation.'" Owners argue that preservation ordi-
nances are so burdensome that they effect a constitutionally pro-
hibited taking of private property for public "use" without just
compensation." Meanwhile, preservationists argue that the ordi-
nances are a reasonable and necessary means for protecting irre-
placeable resources."
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court addressed for the
first time the constitutionality of a historic preservation ordinance
challenged on takings grounds." In Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, the Supreme Court held that the New York City
landmarks law did not effect a taking when applied to Grand Cen-
tral Terminal because the law did not deny the property owner,
example of an important early preservation case, see United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (Court held that federal government acquisition of
the Gettysburg Battlefield area for historic preservation, protecting it from commercial
development, was a purpose for which eminent domain powers could be used).
"I David Bonderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESER-
VATION LAW, supra note 18, at 350.
" The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This was made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment in.Chicago, B. & 0. Railway Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897). The principle behind regulatory takings was described by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: "The general rule at least is, that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For commentary that criticizes this principle when applied to land-
use regulation, see Bonderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, supra note 41, at 351 n.24.
Preservation ordinances have also been challenged on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process grounds. These amendments state that "no person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. CONST. amend. V, and that "[no] state
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g„ Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 599 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980) (court used the Maher test, see infra note 65, to find that a preservation
ordinance barring demolition of a historic townhouse belonging to the church did not violate
constitutional due process requirements).
4' See, e.g., Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div.
1968).
" See, e.g., Biddle, supra note 21, at 202.
45 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). For
commentary concerning this important decision, see Norman Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand
Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TOR and a Resolution of
the RegulatosylTaking Impasse, 7 EcoLocv L.Q. 731 (1978); Linda B. Samuels, After Penn
Central: A Look Down the Track at Constitutional Taking, 8 REAL EST, L.J. 230 (1980); Thane
D. Scott, Comment, Alas in Wonderland.' The Impact of Penn Central v. New York on Historic
Preservation Law and Policy, 7 B.C. Ehorri.. AF's. L. REV. 317 (1978).
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Penn Central, reasonable use of the building as a railroad station."
In Penn Central, the owner of Grand Central Terminal attempted
to erect a commercial office tower atop the landmark-designated
terminal. 47 The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion ("the Commission") denied permission for this construction on
the basis that it would destroy the meaningful presence of the
structure as a landmark." Penn Central filed suit, claiming that its
property had been taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment."
The Penn Central Court admitted that it had been unable to
devise a standard for determining what action constitutes a taking,
and indicated that the outcome of each case would be determined
largely by its specific circumstances. 5° The Court, however, did out-
line several factors important in determining whether a taking had
occurred: first, the degree to which the challenged ordinance inter-
fered with the "distinct investment-backed expectations" of the
claimant, second, the character of the challenged government ac-
tion, and finally, whether the regulation promoted 'the health,
safety, morals or general welfare by prohibiting ... contemplated
uses of land." 51
46 438 U.S. at 136-37.
4 ' Id. at 116-17.
" Id. at 117-18. The Commission stated that the new tower would "reduce the Landmark
itself to the status of a curiosity." Landmarks, the Commission stated, "cannot be divorced
from their settings," and alterations must "enhance" rather than "overwhelm" the original
design. Id. (quoting record on appeal at 2251).
" Id. at 117-18. The New York Court of Appeals decision later affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Penn Central may be found at 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977).
5° Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
51
 Id. The fact that a regulation effectively diminishes the value of the property does
not of itself constitute a regulatory taking. Id. Nor is the "most [economically] beneficial use"
of the property required. Id. at 125 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
592-93 (1962)), One commentator suggests that federal courts will usually uphold land-use
regulations that severely 'restrict property if there is any reasonable use remaining. See
Boibderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, supra note 41, at 353.
Tice Penn Central Court indicated that it would be more ready to find a taking when the
interference with property could be considered a physical invasion of the property. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124. A physical invasion may be determinative of a taking if it reaches
the "extreme form of a permanent physical occupation." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
The Court also stated that if the regulation provided a sufficient public benefit, adverse
effect apon property interests would not violate the Fifth Amendment. Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124. The application of this principle is well illustrated by Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592
(Court upheld ordinance banning excavations below the water table because the regulation
protected many schoolchildren in the area, despite plaintiffs' claim that it shut down their
business). The Court pointed out that zoning laws are a classic example of the principle that
public utility may supersede private profit. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (citing Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926)). Preservation controls have been called
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In analyzing these factors, the Penn Central Court held that the
landmark designation did not interfere with the operation of the
terminal in the manner in which it had been used for the past sixty-
five years. 52 Therefore, the Court stated, the Commission's refusal
to allow the tower project did not automatically prevent the owners
from receiving a reasonable economic return on their investment."
The Supreme Court rejected the owner's argument that a physical
taking had occurred in that Penn Central would not be able to use
its air development rights in the space above the terminal.54 The
Court stated that the character of the city's action must be assessed
in light of the interference with the parcel as a whole, and noted
that the preservation law did not interfere with the economic or
physical use of the present terminal. 55 Also, the Court noted that
the landmark ordinance was a beneficial measure that promoted
the general public welfare through the preservation of valuable
aesthetic and cultural resources." Applying the relevant factors, the
Court ruled that the landmark law did not constitute a taking as
applied to Grand Central Terminal."
The Penn Central Court, beyond attempting to clarify standards
for takings analyses, also discussed preservation law generally. First,
the Court noted that the New York preservation ordinance did not
discriminate specifically against Penn Central." The Court distin-
guished landmark laws from discriminatory "spot" zoning by noting
that the New York preservation law was a "comprehensive plan" of
preservation applicable to qualified buildings located in any part of
the city.59 The Court also reiterated its position that aesthetic value
"zoning's sibling," and Penn Central frequently has been compared to Euclid. See Duerksen,
Local Preservation Law, supra note 19, at 30.
52 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
53 Id. The Court stated that proof of sufficiently changed circumstances, such that Penn
Central could no longer obtain a reasonable return on its property, could provide a basis for
relief. Id. at 138 n.36.
54 Id. at 130.
35 Id. The Court also noted that Penn Central's air rights were transferable to other sites
in the vicinity. Though these rights would not necessarily qualify as just compensation if a
taking had been found, the Court stated that these rights nonetheless had value, and that
the existence of such rights must be considered in the takings analysis. Id. at 137.
58 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
" Id.
38
 Id. at 132.
59 Id. "Spot" zoning is a "land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular
parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones," Id. The Court
noted that more than 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts had been designated under the
New York law at the time of this decision. Id.
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alone may provide sufficient basis for a building to be designated a
landmark. 6° Finally, the Court rejected the argument that landmark
designation is arbitrary, subjective or a matter of taste, and therefore
unfair, by noting that a property owner has the right to judicial
review of the designation if the owner believes that it was unfairly
made. 6 ' Penn Central established the rule that if a reasonable eco-
nomic return is available to the owner of a landmarked property,
application of a historic preservation ordinance to the property will
not constitute a taking. 62
Penn Central concerned commercial property, but the United
States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of
landmark designations of property owned and operated by non-
profit organizations.° The issue, however, has been addressed by a
number of lower courts. In 1968, for example, the New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, enunciated a takings standard for
non-profit organizations in Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt."
The court declared that a facially valid historic preservation ordi-
nance may be unconstitutional if it physically or financially prevents,
or seriously interferes with, the carrying out of the "charitable
purpose" of the particular organization affected. 65 In Snug Harbor,
6° Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129. The Court chose to make this point clear, even though
it was uncontested by the appellants. Id.
▪ Id. at 132-33. The Court stated that courts should have no greater difficulty identi-
fying unfair action in preservation cases than they do in the familiar context of zoning. Id.
62 Id. at 138. For a discussion of cases illustrating the problems involved in establishing
a taking, see Bonderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, supra note 41, at 354-56.
5.1
 A court has examined, however, a takings claim brought by a religious organizaticin
by applying a Penn Central-type analysis. See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York,
914 F.2d 348, 356-57 (2c1 Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I 1 1 S. Ct. 1103 (1991). See infra notes 263-
302 and accompanying text for a discussion of St. Bartholomew's.
• 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div. 1968). The case was actually remanded for further
factual findings, but the appellate division took the opportunity to announce what it consid-
ered to be the applicable test.
65 Id. A "reasonable return on investment" standard, such as that enunciated in Penn
Central, is inappropriate for application to a non-profit organization and courts have endea-
vored to find an analogous test for these situations. See, e.g., Society for Ethical Culture v.
Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925 (N.Y. '1980); Snug Harbor, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316; cf. Maher v. City
of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653, 662 (E.D. La. 1974), 516 F.2d 1051, 1065-67 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). In Maher, a New Orleans historic district ordinance
was upheld against a claim that its application to an antique cottage in the Vieux Carre
section of New Orleans, barring the owner from proceeding with demolition, constituted a
taking. 516 F.2d at 1067. The district court upheld the ordinance because the owner had
not proven that the law precluded use of the property for any purpose for which the property
was "reasonably adapted." 371 F. Supp. at 662 (quoting Summers v. City of Glen Cove, 217
N.E.2d 663, 664 (N.Y. 1966)). In its affirmance, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
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the non-profit owner of a landmarked retirement home for sailors
wanted to demolish the house and construct a modern facility.66
Because the New York City historic preservation ordinance prohib-
ited the demolition, the charitable organization filed suit, claiming
its property had been unconstitutionally taken. 67
In addressing the takings claim, the court reasoned that allow-
ing a non-profit organization to be free of property restrictions that
seriously interfere with its charitable purpose is comparable to al-
lowing a commercial property owner a reasonable use or return
from such property.68 The court also indicated that the appropriate
guidelines for determining the existence of impermissible interfer-
ence would be whether conversion of the existing structure to a
useful condition or maintenance of the property in its current con-
dition would be prohibitively expensive for the owner, in light of
that owner's resources.69 Thus, the Snug Harbor court established a
standard specifically formulated for determining the existence of a
taking with respect to non-profit organizations."
The New York Court of Appeals applied the charitable purpose
test in 1974 in a case involving the property of a religious organi-
zation in Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York." The Lu-
theran Church court held that the landmark status of a historic town-
house, which was used by the church as office space, seriously
interfered with the ability of the church to achieve its charitable
purpose and thus constituted a taking.72 The Lutheran Church court
equated charitable and religious purposes and held the Snug Harbor
that, although the property was non-profit, the owner had not shown an inability to receive
a reasonable return on commercial rental of the existing structure, and that no alternative
uses of the property were available. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1066. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that Maher supports the principle that historic district legislation gen-
erally will not give rise to a taking. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131. The cottage in Maher
was located in a historic district and was not individually designated, a distinction some courts
have noted in their takings analyses. See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church v. City of York, 360
A.2d 257, 260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). The York court applied the Maher standards rather
than the Snug Harbor "charitable purpose" test because the building in question was part of
a historic district and was capable of relatively inexpensive conversion to a useful purpose.
York, 360 A.2d at 261.
aa 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
67 Id.
66 Id.
69 Id.
7° See id.
71 316 N.E.2d 305, 311 (N.Y. 1974).
72 Id. at 312.
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charitable purpose standard applicable to property owned by a
religious organization."
The church had renovated and extended the townhouse, but
found that it could not increase the size of the structure sufficiently
to meet the organization's needs. The church argued that the build-
ing should be demolished and a new, adequate one constructed. 74
The church further argued that denial of permission to do so
constituted a taking because, absent demolition, the church would
have to abandon the building."
Adopting the church's argument, the court declared that, be-
cause the church had proven its need to expand and had exhausted
all possible expansion alternatives allowed by the ordinance, contin-
ued application of the landmark designation to the townhouse
would be confiscatory. 76 Therefore, the court held that the Com-
mission's refusal to permit the demolition seriously interfered with
the carrying out of the church's religious mission.77 Despite the
presence of a taking in this case, the court refused to strike down
the preservation ordinance entirely, stating that not all landmark
designations are confiscatory. 78
In sum, historic preservation legislation generally has been
challenged on the ground that it effected an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation." Penn Central established the principle
that a preservation ordinance will not constitute a taking unless it
denies the owners of the property a reasonable return on their
investment. 8° Snug Harbor enunciated the charitable purpose test,
which provides that a preservation ordinance will effect a taking of
the property of a non-profit organization if it prevents or seriously
interferes with the charitable mission of the owner. 8 ' Finally, Lu-
theran Church illustrated the application of the charitable purpose
test to the property of a religious organization, where the preser-
vation law was held to have a confiscatory effect. 82
73 See Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d at 312.
74 Id. at 307-08.
73 Id.
76 Id. at 312.
77 Id. The court's opinion made no mention of any First Amendment claims; if any such
claims were put forward by the church, they apparently were dismissed summarily. See id. at
305, 312. First Amendment concerns were not addressed in the lower court either. See 345
N.Y.S.2d 24, 25-26 (App. Div. 1973).
73 Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d at 311.
Bonderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, supra note 41, at 350.
80 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
61 Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div. 1968).
59 316 N.E.2d at 311-12.
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE REGULATION
First Amendment challenges to land use regulations, such as
zoning laws, began to arise in the 1960s." Courts frequently have
treated historic preservation ordinances as a specialized form of
zoning, and these ordinances also have come under First Amend-
ment attack. 84 The resolution of these cases necessarily must depend
heavily on judicial interpretation of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. An exploration of the jurisprudential development of
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is useful in under-
standing the impact of these constitutional provisions on the appli-
cation of preservation statutes to religious properties.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment of the Constitution mandates that no
law be passed that prohibits the free exercise of religion." The
United States Supreme Court has noted that, because religion is not
defined in the Constitution, free exercise inquiry must establish
precisely what freedom is covered by this constitutional guarantee."
The Court has broken down Free Exercise protection into two
concepts: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act.87 The
Court has stated that the first of these guaranteed liberties is abso-
lute, but that the second is "subject to regulation for the protection
of society."88
Although religious belief itself is protected against governmen-
tal interference, the Court has acknowledged that circumstances
arise in which the law may permissibly interfere with religious prac-
tices. 89 For a number of years, these circumstances generally have
been grounded upon the existence of a compelling state interest in
the regulation that causes the interference. 90 In determining
whether a burden on the free exercise of religion is permissible,
85 See Crewdson, supra note 8, at 138-39.
"4 See, e.g., Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 1968).
See infra notes 232-367 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving these
claims.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
117 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
as Id.
89 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. The Court stated that to hold otherwise would be to make
the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land." Id. at 167.
9° See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See infra notes 102-13 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case.
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the Court has distinguished between laws that specifically regulate
religious activity (produce a direct burden) and those that inciden-
tally affect religion through neutral laws of general applicability
(produce an indirect burden). 91 According to the Court, laws that
directly burden religion have no legitimate alternative purpose and
therefore violate the First Amendment." The Court traditionally
has examined laws that indirectly burden religion, through analysis
of the primary objective of the regulation, to determine if an im-
permissible infringement of religious freedom is present."
The Supreme Court illustrated its distinction between laws that
directly and indirectly burden the free exercise of religion in 1961
in Braunfeld v. Brown. 94 In Braunfeld, the Court held that a Penn-
sylvania statute forbidding retail sales on Sunday did not violate an
Orthodox Jewish merchant's free exercise rights. 95 The merchant
claimed that the law discriminated against his religion by forcing
him to choose between observing his Saturday sabbath and opening
his shop only five days a week."
The Court upheld the statute because it satisfied three basic
principles. First, the Court stated that the law was a general one
within the power of the state to enact." The Court noted that the
state had the power to designate, for public welfare considerations,
a specific day as a general day of rest." Second, the Court observed
that the purpose of the Pennsylvania law was to advance secular
goals, and intended no religious conflict." Finally, the Court con-
cluded that the regulation could be considered the only feasible
means by which the state could accomplish its lawful goal.'" The
91 Compare McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 (1978) (law barring ministers from
holding public office held to be unconstitutional) with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
601-02, 609 (1961) (Sunday closing law upheld despite its economic impact on Jewish
merchant whose sabbath is Saturday). In the first case, the burden is direct; in the latter case,
the burden is indirect. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) ("It is one
thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to
exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.").
92 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603.
" See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603.
" 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
" Id. at 609.
99 hi. at 601.
92 Id. at 607.
" Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
" Id.
1 " Id. The Court also noted that the state could create an exemption to the law for
individuals such as this merchant, but held that the state was not required to do so because
the exemption could undermine the effectiveness of the regulation. Id. at 608-09.
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Court considered highly significant the fact that the Sunday closing
law did not regulate any of the merchant's religious practices, but,
in addressing a secular activity, only indirectly burdened his exercise
of religion by making it "more expensive. ',101
The Supreme Court imposed tighter scrutiny on legislative
actions affecting the practice of religion in 1963 in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner. 102
 The Sherbert Court held that South Carolina could not deny
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired
from her job for refusing to work on Saturday, the sabbath day of
her religion. 10" The state claimed that the plaintiff had refused
suitable employment without good cause, thereby disqualifying her
for benefits under South Carolina law.'" The state maintained that
the subsequent denial of unemployment benefits did not restrict
the plaintiff's freedom of religion.'"
In addressing the free exercise question, the Court held that
the South Carolina law infringed the plaintiff's freedom of reli-
gion.loci By forcing her to choose between her religion and the
prospect of impoverishment, the Court reasoned that the state's
denial of benefits was tantamount to economically coercing the
plaintiff's religious convictions.' 07 The Court analogized this denial
to the state imposition of a fine for Saturday worship.'"
While holding that the law created an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of First Amendment rights, the Court recognized that the law
was not directed specifically at religion, thus allowing the state to
show a compelling interest to justify its law.w° The Court attempted
1 ° 1 Id. at 605.
02 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, in which he argued
that the Court's Sherbert decision is inconsistent with Braunfeld. Id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart noted that, although the Sherbert Court ostensibly reconciled its
holding with Braunfeld, the Court had implicitly rejected its prior thinking by recognizing a
higher standard of free exercise protection. Id. The Braunfeld case was wrongly decided,
Justice Stewart maintained, and should have been explicitly overruled. Id.
I" Id. at 409-10; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
138-39, 146 (1987) (state's denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh-Day Adventist who
converted to the faith during the term of her employment and refused to work Saturdays
violated her free exercise rights); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 709, 720 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness, who was
fired for refusing to violate religious beliefs by working in the munitions department of his
employer, impermissibly burdened the free exercise of his religion).
101 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
108 Id.
106 Id. at 403.
I" Id. at 404.
1°6
109 Id. at 405-06; cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (Court did not
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to distinguish the case from Braunfeld by pointing to the absence of
a compelling state interest, on the part of South Carolina, that would
allow violation of the plaintiff's free exercise rights."° The Court
noted that—unlike Braunfeld, where the allowance of an exemption
for the class represented by the plaintiff would jeopardize the state
goal of providing a single day of rest for all workers—the plaintiff
in Sherbert easily could be exempted from the eligibility require-
ments of the state compensation statute without compromising that
state's goal."' Thus, no compelling interest prevented the state from
adapting its law to avoid violating its citizens' freedom of religion. 112
The Sherbert test, which expands the Braunfeld analysis, requires a
court to determine whether a challenged law actually infringes on
the plaintiff's free exercise rights, advances secular goals, is justified
by a compelling state interest, and is the only feasible means for
achieving the state's goals." 3
The Supreme Court further strengthened free exercise pro-
tection in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder." 4 The Yoder Court held that
requiring schoolchildren of the Old Order Amish religion to comply
with Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law violated their
freedom of religion. 15 The Amish removed their children from the
state's public schools upon completion of eighth grade, in advance
of the permissible age of sixteen, and continued educating them at
home in accordance with Amish religious and social customs.' 16
Addressing the claim of unconstitutional religious infringe-
ment, the Supreme Court conceded that the state law had a valid
secular purpose." 7 The Court, however, noted that the religion
clauses of the First Amendment have been given a high priority
and have been allowed to prevail over other strong societal inter-
ests." 8 The Court stated that otherwise neutral, valid laws may, in
specifically mandate a showing of a compelling state interest in the Braunfeld opinion, only a
showing that the state's regulatory objective was one within its power).
"0 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
1 " Compare Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09 with Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605.
112 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09.
"3 See id. at 403, 406-07. Braunfeld and Sherbert reach opposite outcomes under factual
circumstances that seemingly do not justify such disparate results. See id. at 417-18 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
114 See 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
", Id. at 220, 234.
Ho Id. at 207, 209, 223. The Amish contended that their children would be unable to
develop proper Amish religious values, due to extended exposure to an environment hostile
to those values, if forced to continue in public schools beyond the eighth grade. Id. at 211.
117
 See id. at 213.
"B Id. at 214.
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their application, unacceptably burden the free exercise of reli-
gion." 9
Although the Court regarded the school attendance law as a
neutral regulation, the Court stated that the Amish had sufficiently
demonstrated that compliance with the law would burden the free
exercise of their religious beliefs.' 20 The Court held that the state's
interest in a uniform compulsory school attendance law was not
sufficiently compelling to overcome the fundamental interest of
parents in the religious upbringing of their children.' 2 ' The Court
therefore refused to sustain the law's application to the Amish.' 22
The Yoder Court indicated that the level of state interest considered
"compelling" is very high, and indicated that even a neutral, useful
law may not outweigh First Amendment protections.' 23
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court could not achieve a stable
consensus regarding free exercise analysis.' 24 In 1988, in Lyng v.
"9 Id. at 220.
,2° Id. at 219.
121 Id. at 213-14, 228-29. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
Justice Scalia used this combination of parental interest and free exercise right to distinguish
Yoder from that case. 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 n.1 (1990). See infra notes 133-64 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Smith.
122
 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236. The Court also noted the issue of the sincerity of religious
claims that are asserted in First Amendment actions, implying that clear proof of such
sincerity is especially important in cases where the challenged law advances an obviously
useful social goal. Id. at 235-36 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.l (1963)). In
this case, the Court observed, the fact that the Amish had functioned for three centuries as
an identifiable religious sect demonstrated the genuineness of their religious convictions. Id.
at 235. The Court added that the Amish were probably one of the few religious groups that
could make such a strong showing. Id.
"3 Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), where the Supreme Court held that
members of the Old Order Amish, who have a religious obligation to provide for fellow
members in a manner analogous to the Social Security system, are nevertheless not exempt
from payment of Social Security taxes. Id, at 261. The Court stated that the governmental
interest in preserving the integrity of the Social Security system is sufficiently strong to justify
this burden on the Amish people's free exercise of religion. Id. at 260. For other recent
decisions involving taxes on religious groups, see, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization of California, 110 S. Ct. 688, 697 (1990) (application to religious organization
of sales and use tax does not violate the group's freedom of religion); Hernandez v. Com-
missioner, 490 U.S. 680, 695-96, 699-700 (1989) (disqualification of "charitable contribution"
payments made by members to the Church of Scientology for "auditing" and training sessions
does not violate the members' First Amendment rights); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 577-85 (1983) (government interest in eliminating racial discrimination suffi-
ciently compelling to uphold IRS denials of charitable tax-exempt status to educational
institutions that practice religiously-motivated racial discrimination).
124 See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1986). In that case the Court vacated
a lower court's injunction barring the government from using the plaintiff's Social Security
number in processing welfare benefits. Id. at 698. The Court held that the government's use
of a numerical identifier for the plaintiff's child did not impermissibly burden the family's
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Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Supreme Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government
from developing federal lands used by Native Americans for reli-
gious rituals.' 25 The Native Americans claimed that their religious
ceremonies would be disturbed by state timber harvesting and road
construction.' 26
The Court described the potential effect of the development
on the Native Americans' religion as extremely grave, but held that,
although the government program would make their religious prac-
tices more difficult, it was not intended to coerce their religious
beliefs directly. 1 Y" In de-emphasizing the compelling interest test,
the Court stated that, although indirect burdens on free exercise
rights must be scrutinized, the government is not required to pro-
vide a compelling justification for every burden that its actions
impose.' 28 The Court reasoned that prohibition is a critical compo-
nent of the First Amendment text, and stated that the government
program to develop its own land was not designed to have a pro-
hibitive effect or to coerce individuals into actions contrary to their
religious beliefs.' 29
The Court noted that, although the effect of the program on
the Native Americans' religion was potentially significant, it was
impractical for the Court to make distinctions in the application of
legal doctrines based on their impact on a particular plaintiff's
free exercise rights, despite a parent's claim that the numerical identifier would harm the
spirit of their daughter, retarding her spiritual development. Id. at 696. In his plurality
opinion, Chief Justice Burger moved away from the opinion he wrote in Yoder and advocated
a less rigorous free exercise standard by stating that "the government meets its burden when
it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uni-
form in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id.
at 707-08. Five Justices disagreed with this analysis, however. See id. at 713 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part); id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Brennan and Marshall, 11.); id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting). In Hobbit v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission, the Court's majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, also rejected
Chief Justice Burger's Roy reasoning. 980 U.S. 136, 141 (1987). Justice Brennan stated that
the Roy plurality's test provides only the "barest level of minimum scrutiny," already guar-
anteed by the Equal Protection Clause, for important First Amendment values. Id. at 141-
42. Recently, however, the Court has again lessened the burden on government in free
exercise inquiry. See infra notes 123-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
126
 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988). The Court attached significance to the fact that the
use of federal lands was at issue. Id. at 453 (the rights of Native Americans to practice their
religion "do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its own land").
126 Id. at 443.
127
 Id. at 451-52.
In Id. at 450-51.
126
 Id. at 451, 453.
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spiritual development.' 30 Government activities that do not prohibit
the free exercise of religion, the Court stated, cannot be subject to
a de facto veto power by any religious group that claims that the
activities interfere with its search for spiritual fulfillment.' 3 ' The
Lyng decision did not eliminate the compelling state interest test,
but it established that the government need not show a compelling
justification for programs that make given religious practices more
difficult, if these programs do not coerce individuals into actions
contrary to their religious beliefs.'"
In April of 1990 the Supreme Court's free exercise jurispru-
dence changed significantly in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith.'" The Court held that Oregon's prohib-
ition of the sacramental use of peyote was constitutionally permis-
sible, and that denial of unemployment compensation based on
misconduct charges stemming from such use did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.'" In Smith, a private drug rehabilitation or-
ganization fired the plaintiff employees from their jobs for ingesting
peyote at a ceremony of the Native American Church.'" The state
refused to grant the plaintiffs unemployment compensation because
their dismissal was for "misconduct."'" After the Oregon Supreme
Court determined that peyote consumption for religious purposes
was illegal under state law, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether Oregon's prohibition of such conduct violated the
Free Exercise Clause.'"
In holding that Oregon's law does not violate the First Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court refused to employ the Sherbert test of
requiring compelling state justification for any law that infringes on
I" Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
131 Id. at 453.
133 See id. at 450-51.
'" See 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-03 (1990). The Court's decision in this case has been
described as a "radical departure" from its previous free exercise jurisprudence. David G.
Savage, Won't Shield Religions from Law, Court Says, L.A. TIMES, April 18, 1990, 11 A, at 1.
134 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
'" Id. at 1597-98.
' 1° Id. at 1598.
137 See id. at 1599. The United States Supreme Court heard the case twice. The first
time, the Court vacated the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for a
determination as to whether sacramental peyote use was allowed under the state's controlled
substance law. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 662
(1988). After the Oregon Supreme Court determined that sacramental use of peyote did
violate the state drug law, Smith v. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources,
763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988), the United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari.
489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
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free exercise rights.'" The Court stated that this test is inappro-
priate for evaluating challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws
that only incidentally burden religious practice. 139 The Oregon drug
law was held to be such a provision because it did not attempt to
interfere with religious belief."° The Court noted that it has never
held that individuals are relieved of their obligation to comply with
generally applicable laws simply because of an indirect burden on
religion. 141
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia distinguished cases in
which application of such a neutral, generally applicable law has
been barred by pointing out that those situations implicated the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional pro-
tections. 142 He also maintained that all governmental actions that
had been invalidated solely on the basis of the Sherbert test had
involved unemployment compensation denials.'" Justice Scalia dis-
tinguished these other cases by noting that they, unlike Smith, con-
cerned situations in which the state had enacted a system of indi-
vidualized exemption from disqualification provisions of the
unemployment compensation statute.'" These exemptions, he ob-
served, were based on a particular plaintiff's ability to show that he
or she had "good cause" for quitting or refusing employment.' 45
Justice Scalia noted that given such an exemption system, a circum-
128 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Sherbert.
129 Id.
"I' Id. at 1602. Oregon's drug law was held not to "attempt to regulate religious beliefs,
the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs." Id.
The Oregon drug law involved criminal sanctions, a point clearly noted by Justice Scalia. Id.
This raises the question as to whether the Smith rationale is limited to the criminal context.
Judging from the results so far in the lower courts, the answer appears to be an unqualified
"no." See Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991);
Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dept of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194-96 (3d Cir.
1990) (both cases applying Smith in a civil context). See infra notes 263-302 and accompanying
text for a discussion of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354
(2d Cir. 1990), which also applied Smith in a civil context.
'4 ' Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
142 Id, at 1601. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (compelling state
interest is required when the rights of parenthood are combined with the right to free
exercise of religion). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, where the Court held that vesting the
power to license religious and 'charitable solicitations in the secretary of the state's public
welfare council was a violation of the First Amendment. 310 U.S. 296, 305-06 (1940). The
Court stated that the secretary's duty was discretionary, not ministerial, and therefore impli-
cated free speech and press questions as well as free exercise concerns. Id.
142 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
' 44 Id. (citing Bowen v. RoY;,476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
15 Id. at 1603.
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stance not relevant in Smith, refusal to extend it to cases of "religious
hardship" without a compelling reason was unconstitutional.'"
Justice Scalia stated that, by following the Sherbert test, the Court
might create "an extraordinary right" that would enable individuals
to ignore generally applicable laws, for which the state is unable to
provide a sufficiently compelling interest, by merely positing a re-
ligious mandate.' 47 He noted that the Sherbert test deems presump-
tively invalid the application to a religious objector of any law that
does not protect an interest of "the highest order."'" In disagreeing
with this approach, Justice Scalia stated that the political process
must be relied upon to provide legislation that will be solicitous of
valued religious beliefs.'" He rejected the notion of employing the
Sherbert test when the burdened conduct is "central" to the individ-
ual's religion because such an imprecise standard would require an
impermissible intrusion of the Court's authority into the tenets of
a particular religion. 150 Justice Scalia also noted that, under this
approach, the sincerity of the asserted religious belief or the validity
of the litigant's interpretation of the religion's precepts would have
to be evaluated, and that the Court must not presume to determine
these issues.' 5 '
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in Smith, but
sharply criticized the majority for departing from well-established
First Amendment jurisprudence. 152 She stated that the First
Amendment does not distinguish between laws that directly target
' 46 Id.
147 Id. at 1600. Justice Scalia stated that any society adopting a compelling interest
standard "across the board" would be "courting anarchy." Id. at 1605.
143 Id.
146 Id. at 1606.
13° Id, at 1604. Justice Scalia asked "[w]hat principle of law or logic can be brought to
bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?"
Id. The government's ability to regulate conduct for societal benefit cannot depend on
"measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual develop-
ment." Id. at 1603 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988)).
131 Id, at 1604 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 950 U.S.
707, 713-16 (1981)) (courts should not evaluate the sincerity of religious.conviction by
interpreting the specific beliefs held).
1" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with
the result that the Court reached, but disagreed with its reasoning. Id. She argued that the
Oregon law was not unconstitutional because the state interest in the uniform application of
its drug laws outweighed the burden on the plaintiff's free exercise of religion. Id. at 1614
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, used a similar analysis
to reach an opposite conclusion. See id. at 1622-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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religion and laws that are neutral and generally applicable.'" Justice
O'Connor argued that the majority's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause would render its protections applicable only in the
"extreme and hypothetical" situation in which a law directly regu-
lates religious practices.'" She contended that the majority's ap-
proach was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and had
been explicitly rejected in Yoder, where the Court stated that the
Free Exercise Clause protects certain rights from any governmental
regulation, even generally applicable laws.' 55 Although the Court
contended that the prior cases in which a neutral law had been
invalidated had involved "hybrid" claims, combining First Amend-
ment rights with other constitutional guarantees, Justice O'Connor
maintained that the decisions in those cases had expressly relied on
free exercise jurisprudence.'"
Justice O'Connor distinguished cases in which application of
the Sherbert test had been rejected by noting that they involved
specialized types of restrictions, namely, military and prison regu-
lations, for which the Court traditionally had not required a showing
of a compelling governmental interest.' 57 She argued that a law that
impermissibly, albeit indirectly, burdens the free exercise of religion
is one that forces an adherent to abandon or conform his or her
religious beliefs in order to attain an equal place in the civil com-
munity.'" Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's reasoning
that the political process should be relied on to protect the rights
of minority religions.' 59 The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause,
she stated, is to ensure that minority religious interests are not
overwhelmed by an unsympathetic majority.' 6° Justice O'Connor
concluded that the Sherbert compelling interest test, by enabling the
Court to determine thoughtfully the constitutional significance of
any burden borne by an individual plaintiff, properly implements
"3 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155 Id.
155 Id. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,219—
20 (1972)).
156 Id. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
507-10 (1986) (Court did not apply heightened scrutiny in upholding an Air Force regulation
that barred a soldier from wearing a yarmulke while on duty, stating that the judiciary must
show military regulations great deference).
155 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
' 5° Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1" Id.
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the First Amendment's intent of preserving religious freedom in a
pluralistic society. 161
Smith established that neutral, generally applicable laws that
incidentally burden the free exercise of religion need not be sub-
jected to the Sherbert test.' 62 The Court concluded that requiring
such a test makes all but the most crucial laws subject to suspension
for anyone claiming a religious objection.'" Because the compelling
interest test requires an evaluation of the burdened action's cen-
trality to a person's religious faith, the Court held that it must be
abandoned.'"
The Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence has
long recognized that laws that directly regulate religion are uncon-
stitutional. 165 The level of scrutiny that the Court applies to laws
that are generally neutral, but which indirectly burden religious
practice, has not remained constant. The Court's Sherbert and Yoder
decisions enunciated a requirement that states show a compelling
justification for any law that indirectly burdens religious practice, a
requirement not specifically included in previous opinions such as
Braunfeld.' 66 Recently, however, the Court's Smith decision has re-
lieved the states of this burden, holding that indirect infringements
of religious rights by neutral, generally applicable laws do not re-
quire a compelling justification to be constitutionally permissible.' 67
B. The Establishment Clause
In addition to prohibiting interference with the exercise of
religion, the Constitution prohibits the government from facilitating
the establishment of religion.'" The Establishment Clause ensures
the fundamental separation of church and state.'" It differs from
the Free Exercise Clause in that it prohibits the enactment of laws
that effect government involvement with religion, whether or not
161 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1611, 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
I" Id. at 1603.
I" Id, at 1600.
164 Id. at 1605 n.5.
leS See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
1" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Shirbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
167 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
I" U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
159 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (Establishment
Clause created a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and
civil authority).
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those laws affect individual religious beliefs or practices."° Like the
Free Exercise Clause, however, the scope of the Establishment
Clause has taken shape on a case-by-case basis."'
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court enunciated specific
criteria for determining the scope of the Establishment Clause in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.' 72 In holding that certain laws in Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island, which provided non-public school teachers with
salary supplements, violated the Establishment Clause, the Court
laid out three criteria for compliance with the clause.'" First, the
law must have a secular purpose. 174 Second, the primary effect of
the law must not advance or inhibit religion.' 76 Finally, the law must
not create excessive "entanglement" of government with religion.' 76
The first criterion refers to the intent of the legislative body in
enacting the law, whereas the second refers to the primary actual
effect that the law has once it is enacted.'" The Court has invoked
the secular purpose requirement to bar governmental action only
when the Court has been satisfied that the challenged law was based
solely on religious considerations.' 78
The Court decided Lemon on the basis of the "entanglement"
criterion.' 79 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated that
this factor can be analyzed in two ways: continuing excessive ad-
ministrative entanglements between government and religious or-
ganizations, and fostering political division along religious lines.'s°
In Lemon, the Court first held that state-aided parochial school
teachers could not be allowed to teach religion because such gov-
ernmental support of religion would violate the Establishment
Clause.' 8 ' The Court then noted that, if these teachers continued
'" See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (Establishment Clause violation may
occur even where a challenged law does not directly coerce non-observing individuals).
171 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
"8 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Court pointed out that the constitutional text
banned any laws "respecting" the establishment of religion; laws that may only lead to the
establishment of religion were therefore covered as well. Id.
"3 Id. at 612-13: The Court noted that the criteria it utilized had been gradually
developed "over many years." Id.
174 Id.
"8 Id.
1" Id.
"7 Id.
' 78 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (Court held that city's inclusion
of a creche in a public Christmas display was based primarily on secular motives and did not
violate the Establishment Clause).
179 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
'so Id. at 613, 622-23.
181 See id. at 619.
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to receive state salary supplements, ensuring that they did not teach
religion would require continual monitoring of the religiously-affil-
iated schools, creating excessive administrative entanglement with
religion.'" Thus, the Court held that the salary supplements were
unconstitutional. 183
Further, the Court observed the danger of political division
along religious lines.'" This danger was present, the Court noted,
because only a few religious organizations would receive benefit
from the salary supplements.' 85 Other groups could feel politically
slighted, the Court reasoned, leading to governmentally-created
social polarization.'88 Thus, the salary supplements violated both
aspects of the entanglement criterion.'" In its discussion of these
state salary supplement laws, the Lemon Court enunciated the basic
criteria that provide an analytical framework for assessing potential
Establishment Clause violations.'"
Two tax cases illustrate the fundamental Establishment Clause
principle of disallowing special treatment when provided solely to
religious organizations. In Walz v. Tax Commission, decided in 1970,
the Supreme Court upheld a New York City tax exemption appli-
cable to religious properties.' 89 The Court held that the exemption
did not violate the Establishment Clause because it had neither the
purpose nor the effect of sponsoring religion.' 90 Providing tax relief
to organizations performing useful and desirable community func-
tions, the Court observed, is a legitimate secular purpose. 19 ' The
Court noted that the exemption applied to a number of organiza-
tions other than churches, including hospitals, libraries and various
non-profit groups. 192 The Court further observed that courts have
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
192 Id. at 619120.
' 94 Id. at 622-23.
las Id.
Is8 Id.
1 " Id. at 619, 623.
' 9" A case presently before the Supreme Court may have a major impact on the continued
vitality of the Lemon test. See Lee v. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090
(1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991). The petitioner in this case, which concerns
the permissibility of prayer at public school graduation ceremonies, has urged that the Court
substantially modify its Establishment Clause jurisprudence by requiring coercion of religious
conformity as a necessary element of a Clause violation. See Petitioners Brief at 14-35, Lee
(No. 90.1014).
' 59 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
' 9° Id. at 672-74.
19' Id. at 672-73.
192 Id. at 673. See id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (breadth of the exemption scheme
critical to its validity).
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historically viewed exemptions to property tax laws granted to
churches as not violative of the Establishment Clause.' 93
Circumstances leading to the opposite result are illustrated by
a 1989 case, Texas Monthly v. Bullock, where the Supreme Court held
that a state sales tax exemption specifically limited to the religious
publications of religious organizations violated the Establishment
Clause.'" The Court reasoned that the exemption served no clear
secular purpose and was intended to provide a special benefit to a
religious group. 195 The Court held that benefits or exemptions pro-
vided to religious organizations must not be confined to those
groups, but must be extended to persons or groups of a non-
religious nature as well; otherwise such benefits constitute an im-
permissible state sponsorship of religion.' 96
In sum, the Establishment Clause is the constitutional safeguard
against governmental sponsorship of or entanglement with reli-
gion.'97
 Because the religion clauses of the Fir-st Amendment are
absolute mandates that tend to serve conflicting goals, the Supreme
Court has urged flexibility in the application of the Establishment
Clause.' 98 The Court has enunciated criteria for determining
whether a law violates the clause: it must have a valid secular pur-
pose, its primary effect must not promote or inhibit religion, and it
must not create excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion. 199
 Walz and Texas Monthly illustrate the principle that special
treatment given to religious organizations does not necessarily vio-
late the Establishment Clause, but such provisions must not be
strictly limited to churches. 29°
C. First Amendment Challenges to Land Use
Controls
Although historic preservation laws only recently have begun
to be challenged on First Amendment grounds, numerous cases
193 Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
194 109 S. Ct. 890, 901, 905 (1989).
195 Id.
' 96 Id. at 897; see also Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir.
1989) (free electricity provided by city to Mormon temple conveyed message of governmental
support for that religion and violated the Establishment Clause).
197 Walz, 397 U.S. at 664, 669.
I" See id. at 668-69. Both religion clauses are "cast in absolute terms" and therefore
may tend to "clash." Id.
199 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
*°° Walz, 397 U.S. at 680; Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 898.
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have challenged other land use controls on the basis of the Free
Exercise Clause. 201 Because landmark ordinances are related to zon-
ing, the problems that zoning ordinances face in these situations
are similar to the problems that preservation laws face. The devel-
opment of the legal standards applied in preservation cases may be
traced by examining the approach that courts have taken in the
more numerous zoning challenges.
In 1968, for example, the Court of Appeals of New York, in
Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, held that the Village of Scarsdale
could not apply a zoning setback ordinance to a synagogue where
the owner would be forced into a substantial amount of otherwise
unnecessary expense. 202 The synagogue already was a functioning
facility, and the temple needed to expand the building's structure
to accommodate its growing membership. 205 In determining that
application of the ordinance to the synagogue would be unconsti-
tutional, the court weighed the interest of the city in enforcing the
ordinance against the burdens placed on the temple. 204
The city planning commission failed to satisfy the court that
the synagogue's violation of the setback ordinance would have an
adverse effect on the safety or welfare of the community. 205 In
weighing the impact on the temple, the court did not discuss the
specific financial burden that would result, but observed that,
through the First Amendment, religious organizations have a more
protected status than commercial enterprises. 206 The court con-
cluded that, based on this constitutional mandate, irreconcilable
conflicts between the right to erect a religious structure and certain
"I For commentary concerning land-use controls and the Free Exercise Clause, see
generally Scott D. Godshall, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 CoLulu.
L. Ray. 1562 (1984); Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for Expanded
Free Exercise Protection, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1984).
In 239 N.E.2d 891, 893-94, 896 (N.Y. 1968). A setback ordinance fixes the required
boundary margins from the structure to the edges of the property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1372 (6th ed. 1990).
'' Westchester, 239 N.E.2d at 894
"4 Id. at 896. The test used here is essentially a Sherbert-type balancing of state interest
against the burden on the church. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-08 (1963)
(indirect burdens on religion are acceptable if the challenged law is supported by a compelling
state interest). The Westchester opinion, however, does not specifically refer to the compelling
interest standard, nor does it cite Sherbert.
"5 Westchester, 239 N.E.2d at 895.
I" Id. at 894. The court's language included religious structures in this special status.
Id. at 896. See generally Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (observing
preferred position enjoyed by religious liberty in our nation's history).
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public welfare concerns generally will be resolved in favor of the
former. 2°7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York took a less solicitous view of First Amendment protection
of religion in 1979 in Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World
Christianity v. Town of New Castle. 20B The court held that denial to
the church of a special use permit for land in a residential area was
constitutionally permissible. 209 The Unification Church wanted to
develop a ninety-eight acre religious retreat in an area that excluded
churches.m The court asserted that First Amendment protection
of the freedom of religion applied to religious beliefs, but was not
absolute in regard to religious activities. 2 " The court noted that
denial of the special use permit did not inhibit the church members'
faith and that the town's interest in its zoning law was of "extreme
significance."212 The court concluded that, when conflict arises be-
tween the free exercise of religion and laws protecting public safety,
health and welfare, incidental burdens on religious practice do not
violate the First Amendment. 213
In a similar decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in 1982, in Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses is. City of Lakewood, upheld a city zoning ordinance exclud-
2G2 Westchester, 239 N.E.2d at 896; see also Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858
F.2d 855, 872 (2d Cir. 1988) (although attempting to implement court-ordered program of
desegregation through its location of housing projects, city still must seek to accommodate
religious organization and avoid First Amendment infringements); City of Sumner v. First
Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Wash. 1982) (advocating accommodation and
flexibility by municipalities when dealing with situations involving possible free exercise
infringements); Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.E.2d
534, 538 (N.Y. 1975) (balancing test employed same deference to religion as Westchester);
North Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman, 481 N.Y.S.2d 142, 146 (App. Div. 1984) (required
special accommodation for religion in its balancing test).
908 See 480 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The court was less solicitous of the
litigants as well, commenting in dicta that although questioning the value of a religious belief
is constitutionally impermissible, inquiring into the bona fides, or genuineness, of that belief
would be permissible. Id. (quoting Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 900 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)).
209 Id..,at 1216. A positive condition for permit approval was placed on a church in
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, where the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld against a free exercise challenge a requirement that a church make certain improve-
ments to the street abutting its property before the city would grant the church a permit to
build a gymnasium on the property. 626 P.2d 668, 675 (Colo. 1981).
212 Holy Spirit Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. at 1213.
2 " Id. at 1216; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (stating
that.the right to religious beliefs is absolute, but the right to religious practice is not).
512 
.Ifoly&pirit Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. at 1216-17.
213 hi.
December 1991]	 HISTORIC PRESERVATION	 121
ing the erection of new churches in all but ten percent of the city. 214
Jehovah's Witnesses had purchased land in a restricted zone with
the intention of building a church there. 215 The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the religious group's argument that
the ordinance infringed upon their free exercise of religion, stating
that the construction of a place of worship is a secular activity and
therefore not subject to First Amendment protections. 216
The court described owning a church building as a "desirable
accessory" to worship, one without particular religious or ritualistic
significance for the Jehovah's Witnesses, and therefore not a "fun-
damental tenet" of their religion. 2 " The court noted that the reli-
gious group was free to purchase an existing church or to worship
in private homes in any part of the city. 218 The court held it unnec-
essary to undertake a balancing test inquiring into the city's interest
in its zoning law. 21 The court, contrasting its case with Sherbert,
observed that in Sherbert the plaintiff's religion caused her to be
subjected to serious sanctions that could threaten her well-being,
whereas the Jehovah's . Witnesses faced only an inconvenient eco-
nomic burden.22° Such an economic burden, the court held, does
not constitute a free exercise infringement. 22 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
applied a modified Sherbert balancing test in 1983 in Grosz v. City of
Miami Beach. 222 The court held that the city's interest in an effective
zoning law outweighed the free exercise infringement the plaintiff
suffered in not being allowed to establish a house of worship in the
garage of his home.225 The plaintiff was an aging rabbi who wanted
214 699 F.2d 303, 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
215 Id. at 304.
216 Id. at 306-07. Two cases in the New York Supreme Court of Monroe County illustrate
the problem that some courts have in classifying a use as religious or secular. In Covenant
Community Church v. Town of Gates, the court held that construction of day-care and recrea-
tional facilities on church property, in violation of the town zoning law, would strengthen
and support the group's religion and therefore was protected under the Free Exercise Clause.
444 N.Y.S. 415, 417, 422 (Sup. Ct. 1981). The same court, but a different judge, held in
Bright Horizon House v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals that a church residential care facility involved
secular activity, even though religious practices were incorporated into the therapy program.
969 N.Y.S.2d 851, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
217 Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307. The court noted that "[all most . . . [the] freedom to
worship is tangentially related to worshipping in [the religious group's] own structure." Id.
215 Id.
212 Id. at 309.
06 Id. at 306.
" L Id.
222 See 721 F.2d 729, 739 (11th Cir. 1983).
225 Id. at 739, 741; see also State v. Cameron, 445 A.2d 75, 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
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to hold services for a small group of followers in a garage that he
had converted into a small synagogue. 224 The city received com-
plaints from neighborhood residents concerning occasional traffic
congestion and excessive noise levels attributable to the syn-
agogue. 225
The court observed that when broad, recognized principles fail
to indicate clearly the outcome in a particular case, an ad hoc bal-
ancing approach should be employed. 226 Deciding that such a test
was necessary, the court ruled that, because some synagogue mem-
bers might not be able to worship with their leader, the plaintiff's
free exercise rights were infringed. 227 The court concluded, there-
fore, that it was required to evaluate the city's interest in its zoning
ordinance. 228
The court held that the purposes of the zoning laws and the
city's interest in enforcing them were significant. 228 The court also
noted that the religious group could practice at other locations
within the city, including one only a few blocks away. 25° In light of
the holdings in other free exercise cases, the court concluded, prob-
lems concerning "convenience, dollars or aesthetics" did not affect
the plaintiff sufficiently to constitute a First Amendment viola-
tion. 23 i
A historic preservation ordinance survived a challenge based
on both free exercise and takings claims in Society for Ethical Culture
v. Spatt, decided in 1980 by the Court of Appeals of New York. 232
In Ethical Culture, the court held that denial of permission to the
1982) (upholding ordinance prohibiting minister from conducting religious services in his
home), aff 'el, 460 A.2d 191,192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
224 Grosz, 721 F.2d at 731-32.
222 Id. at 732.
226 Id. at 738.
n7 Id. at 739.
221 Id. at 738.
229 Id. at 738-39.
22° Id. at 739.
2" Id.
222 " 415 N.E.2d 922, 926 (N.Y. 1980). The lower court decision may be found at 416
N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1979). Another case involving takings and free exercise issues, but
from a different angle, is Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d 23,24
(Colo. 1976). The Pillar of Fire church challenged, on First Amendment grounds, the eminent
domain condemnation of one of their buildings. Id. This compensated taking was contested
by the Pillar of Fire because the church wanted to preserve the original home of their sect.
Id. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the city had a substantially compelling interest
in allowing the Urban Renewal Authority to complete its renewal program, and that this
interest outweighed the burden imposed on the religious group by condemning a building
no longer used principally for religious services. Id. at 25.
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Society for Ethical Culture (the "Society") to demolish its land-
marked building, known as the Meeting House, did not constitute
either a taking or a restriction on the Society's right to the free
exercise of religion."' The Society, a religious and charitable or-
ganization, wished to construct a new building, for rental to non-
religious tenants, on the site occupied by the Meeting House. 234 The
Society claimed that the landmark designation of the Meeting
House, by restricting the Society's ability to financially exploit this
property, effected a taking without just compensation.235 The So-
ciety also argued that the landmark designation interfered with the
free exercise of its religious activities. 236
Addressing the takings issue, the court applied the Snug Harbor
charitable purpose standard, which invalidates a law that prevents
or seriously interferes with the carrying out of a group's charitable
mission. 237 The court held that the Society's activities would not be
prevented or seriously inhibited by sustaining the landmark desig-
nation."' The court placed great weight upon the fact that the
religious activities within the landmark were not disturbed by the
designation, and indicated that the Society's argument was based
primarily on the complaint that the ordinance barred the Society
from putting the property to its most financially lucrative use. 239
Distinguishing Lutheran Church, the court noted that, in that case,
the plaintiff pressed the claim that activities within the existing
structure essentially would be prevented if the ordinance were en-
forced.24° In Ethical Culture, however, the court held that no such
problem existed because the Society's present activities could con-
tinue uninterrupted."'
The court dealt with the free exercise issue rather summarily,
stating that the Society had not claimed that the landmark desig-
233 415 N.E.2d at 926.
234 Id. at 924, 926.
235 Id. at 924.
236 Id. at 926.
2" Id. at 925; see also Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316
(App. Div. 1968). See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Snug
Harbor.
2" Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 925.
2" Id. at 926. The court reiterated the point that there is no constitutional requirement
for allowing an owner the most beneficial use of his or her property. Id. (citing Col&latt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962)).
24° Id. at 925-26; see also Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d
305, 312 (N.Y. 1974).
Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 926.
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nation interfered with its religious practices, only that the designa-
tion curtailed its ability to develop the property for rental to non-
religious tenants. 242 The court clearly indicated that it would con-
sider the distinction between the religious and secular activities of
a religious organization in determining whether the organization's
free exercise rights had been infringed. 243 The court declared that
a religious organization is not entitled to free exercise protection
when engaging in secular pursuits. 244 Thus, the Ethical Culture court
focused the charitable purpose standard upon the specific activities
that a religious organization conducts within a landmark structure
and established that free exercise claims must demonstrate that the
burdened activity is actually religious and not secular. 245
A threshold question in First Amendment challenges to land
use regulations is whether the specific activity affected by the reg-
ulation is religious or secular. 246 As stated by the Ethical Culture
court, if the activity is considered secular, a free exercise claim will
fail. 247 First Amendment challenges to land use controls have been
successful, however, when a court has held the state interest in a
regulation insufficient to warrant burdening an acknowledged re-
ligious exercise.248 But some courts have concluded that land use
regulations, such as zoning and historic preservation ordinances,
make important contributions to public safety and welfare, thereby
justifying incidental infringement on religion. 249
III. RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO HISTORIC
PRESERVATION LEGISLATION
In the 1980s, First Amendment challenges to historic preser-
vation laws began to arise. Because there have not been a large
number of cases as yet, the judicial response to these claims is
unsettled. Several recent cases, however, provide clues as to the
future of historic preservation of religious properties.
242 Id.
"5 See id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246
	 Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 740-41 (11th Cir. 1983); Ethical
Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 926.
247 415 N.E.2d at 926.
242 See, e.g., Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891, 896-97 (N.Y. 1968).
242 See, e.g., Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. Town of New
Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739.
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Manhattan has been the scene of two of the most important
recent cases concerning First Amendment challenges to historic
preservation. The first of these was Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew
v. Barwick, which the Court of Appeals of New York decided in
1986. 25° The case involved an action by a church for declaratory
judgment and, although basing its holding on ripeness doctrine,
the court took the opportunity to discuss the constitutional standard
applicable to religious organizations seeking relief from alleged First
Amendment violations. 25 '
The Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew filed suit against the
New York City Landmarks Commission ("the Commission") seeking .
discontinuance of the landmark status of its church building. 252 The
church claimed that the cost of compliance with the New York
ordinance created a financial hardship that infringed its free exer-
cise rights. 253 The church building was deteriorated and in need of
fairly extensive renovation. 254 The church claimed that, with a seat-
ing capacity of 1,400 and a current congregation numbering around
100, the facility was no longer suited to its needs and beyond its
means to maintain. 255 The church wished to undertake, with a
private development partner, a plan that would rebuild the struc-
ture more in line with the church's current needs and would include
as a separate development a commercial high-rise building. 256
Although not deciding the merits of the case directly, the court
briefly discussed the constitutional standards applicable in consid-
ering free exercise challenges to historic preservation legislation. 257
The court recognized the Westchester standard that invalidates zon-
ing laws that "directly impinge" on religious uses, but declared that
no such impingement was present in the case at bar. 255 The court
stated that any effect generated by the landmark designation on
the plaintiff's religious activities would be only indirect and inci-
dental. 259 In endorsing the charitable purpose test as the appropri-
25° 496 N.E.2d 188, 191-98 (N.Y. 1986).
151 Id. Based on ripeness doctrine, the court held that it could not review the church's
claims until the Commission had been given the opportunity to consider the church's reno-
vation plans and financial hardship status. Id, at 191.
252 Id. at 185.
25$ Id. The church did not challenge the facial validity of the ordinance. Id,
254 Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 187.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 191-93.
25" Id. at 191-92. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Westchester,
"5" Id. at 192.
126	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 33:93
ate standard for evaluating the church's claims, the court stated that
the test is the same regardless of whether a charitable or religious
organization is involved. 260 The court observed that historic preser-
vation ordinances regulate secular activity and stated that it was
only an "incidental overtone" of this case that the plaintiff was a
church. 26 ' Therefore, the court concluded, a First Amendment vi-
olation only occurs when a church's religious mission is disrupted—
a violation that would qualify, under the charitable purpose test, as
an unconstitutional taking as wel1. 262
A church once again challenged the New York City landmark
law on constitutional grounds in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of
New York. 263 In September of 1990, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held, inter alia, that the New York
historic preservation ordinance did not impermissibly interfere with
the church's ability to carry out its religious mission in its existing
facilities.2" The ordinance, therefore, did not violate the church's
free exercise of religion. 265
The main house of worship of St. Bartholomew's Church is
located in mid-town Manhattan and was constructed in the early
part of this century. 266 The New York City Landmarks Commission
("the Commission") designated it as a landmark in 1967, at which
time the church did not oppose the designation. 267 The church
property consists of a main church building, an appended "com-
munity. house," both of which are covered by the designation, and
an adjacent garden and terrace area. 268
In 1983, the church filed an application with the Commission
for a certificate of appropriateness for the purpose of demolishing
the community house and erecting over it and the garden area a
fifty-nine story office tower.269 The ground floors of the new build-
ing were to be used by the church, the remainder to be rented to
N° Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 192.
261 Id.
2" Id.
2113 728 F. Supp. 958, 963, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff 'd, 914 F.2d 348, 350-51 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111  S. Ct. 1103 (1991). As the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the
case, the Second Circuit decision stands, for now as the highest court to rule on First
Amendment challenges to historic preservation ordinances.
2" St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 351.
265
2" Id.
"7 Id.
see
sea
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non-religious, commercial tenants. 27° The Commission denied this
application, on the grounds that it was an inappropriate alteration,
because it called for replacement of the architecturally compatible
community house with an incompatible office tower. 27 ' The church
filed a second application for a certificate of appropriateness in
1984, this time proposing to construct a forty-seven story office
tower.272 After this proposal similarly was denied, the church made
a further application to build the tower, this time making a claim
of financial hardship. 275 The Commission rejected this application
as well in 1986. 274
The church filed suit, claiming that the New York landmark
law violated, both facially and as applied, the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses and effected a taking without just compen-
sation.275 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted summary judgment to the city against the
claim that the landmark law facially violated the First Amend-
ment.27° The court explained that free exercise is burdened only
when a statute coerces the violation of religious beliefs or penalizes
religion by denying to adherents benefits that are available to other
citizens. 277
The court dismissed the argument that whenever a law has any
impact on a religious organization the law must be supported by a
compelling state interest. 278 The court explained that a compelling
interest is only required when an otherwise impermissible free ex-
ercise burden is present.279 The court also stated that the "mere
possibility" of an eventual conflict between a use permitted by the
275 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354.
271 St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 961.
272 Id.
275 Id.
275 Id. at 962.
275 Id. The church made a number of other claims, charging that the landmark law
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it treated char-
itable and commercial institutions differently; violated the doctrine of substantive due process
by depriving, without a compelling state interest, the church of the reasonable income its
property can produce; that the standards of the landmark law are so vague as to violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that certain other procedural prac-
tices of the Commission constitute due process violations. Id. The district court rejected all
of the above claims. Id. at 974-75. On appeal, the church reiterated only its free exercise
and takings claims. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 353.
276 St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
477
	
(citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449
(1988)).
47s
	 at 963 n.9.
2" Id.
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landmark law and the use a church desires to make of its property
creates at most an incidental burden on religion. 28° In the event of
an actual conflict, the court noted, the church could seek judicial
relief. 28 ' Because potential conflict does not trigger the need to show
a compelling state interest, the court found that the landmark des-
ignation of a church is not facially unconstitutional. 282
Regarding application of the preservation ordinance to the
plaintiffs, the court noted that the church had estimated the cost of
necessary repairs and maintenance to its buildings to be approxi-
mately eleven million dollars. 285 The court, however, found ap-
proximately three million dollars to be a more reasonable figure. 284
After examining these costs and the church's financial condition,
the court rejected the claim that the landmark ordinance, as applied,
impermissibly infringed the church's freedom of religion. 285 The
court held that the church had failed to prove that it could no
longer carry out its charitable mission in its existing facilities. 286
Assuming in the church's favor that carrying out its charitable mis-
sion was an exercise of religion, the district court noted that takings
and free.exercise inquiries coincide in cases involving the property
of religious institutions.287 To prevail on either claim, the church
was required to prove that its religious activities were no longer
feasible in its existing buildings. 288 The church failed to prove this,
and the court therefore found no takings or free exercise violations
in the application of the preservation ordinance to the church. 289
The Establishment Clause claim did not generate much discus-
sion by the court. The court stated that a showing of extensive and
continuous monitoring of, or involvement in, church activities is
necessary to trigger the excessive entanglement aspect of Establish-
ment Clause doctrine. 290 The court held that the Establishment
Clause was not implicated by the Commission's limited inquiry into
266 St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
2j" See id. at 964.
20 Id. at 963.
xaa Id. at 967.
284 Id. at 972. The court's finding was based on the estimates made by an independent
expert source. Id. at 971.
26' St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 974.
gas
267 Id. at 966.
Zee
2" Id. at 974-75.
290 Id. at 963; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-23 (1971) (explaining
excessive entanglement analysis).
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the church's finances for the purpose of determining the validity of
a hardship application.29 ' St. Bartholomew's appealed its First and
Fifth Amendment claims to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Shortly after the district court decision, the United States Su-
preme Court handed down Employment Division, Department of Hu-
man Resources v. Smith, which significantly affected free exercise
jurisprudence by eliminating the requirement that the government
show a compelling interest in neutral, generally applicable laws. 292
In the fall of 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
drawing heavily on the Supreme Court's analysis in Smith, upheld
the district court decision in St. Bartholomew's. 2" The Second Circuit
court held that the New York City landmark law is a neutral law of
general applicability and does not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause, despite its effect of reducing the church's potential in-
come. 294 The court noted that the primary question in ascertaining
a burden on religious freedom is whether claimants are coerced in
their religious beliefs or "in the nature of [their religious] prac-
tices."29' The court stated that St. Bartholomew's had presented no
proof of such coercion. 296
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the takings
claim by applying a modified Penn Central "reasonable return on
investment" analysis, altered for use in a non-commercial context. 297
The court rejected the church's argument that a reasonable return
on the use of the community house was not possible, stating that
this standard is applicable only to commercial properties. 298 The
facilities of charitable, non-profit organizations, the court reasoned,
do not yield a return on investment. 299 The court articulated the
proper test as whether the landmark ordinance "impairs the con-
tinued operation of the property in the originally expected use." 3"
Because the church failed to satisfy this test, the court held that no
494
	
Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. 963.
292 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,1606 (1990).
See supra notes 133-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
"' See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354.
24 Id. at 355-56.
"5 Id. at 355 (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
451 ("[t]he critical word in the constitutional text [of the Free Exercise Clause] is 'prohibit.'“)).
225 Id. at 355-56.
20 Id. at 356-57. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
"" St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 357.
1'99 Id.
300 Id. at 356.
130	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:93
unconstitutional taking had occurred. 301 The Second Circuit con-
cluded that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous, that the neutral, generally applicable landmark ordi-
nance did not prevent the church from carrying out its religious
mission in its existing facilities and that, therefore, the ordinance
did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments. 502
In March of 1990, the Washington Supreme Court decided
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, involving a free exercise chal-
lenge to a Seattle historic preservation ordinance. 503 The United
States Supreme Court has vacated this decision and remanded the
case to the Washington court for reconsideration in light of the
holding in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.904 The Washington court's opinion, however, illustrates a
number of the issues raised by the designation of religious prop-
erties as historic landmarks.
The Washington Supreme Court held that a Seattle landmark
law violated the church's First Amendment rights by incorporating
provisions designed to require secular approval over matters of a
religious nature. 303 These provisions, the court held, were unjusti-
fied by any compelling state interest. 508 In 1985, the Seattle Land-
marks Preservation Board ("the Board"), over the objections of the
church, designated the exterior of the First Covenant Church a
historic landmark."7 The church claimed that the landmark des-
ignation violated its free exercise of religion and substantially re-
duced the value of its property.308 The church brought a declaratory
judgment action against the city in 1986, and, after judgment for
the city, eventually appealed the case to the Washington Supreme
Court."9
1°' St. Bartholomew's, 919 F.2d at 357.
502 Id. at 351.
3°3
 787 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wash. 1990). The court stated that its decision was the first in
the United States on this issue. Id. at 1356. The first Si. Bartholomew's case, however, had
already been handed down some three months earlier, on December 13, 1989. St. Bartho-
lomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
3w
 City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 111  S. Ct. 1097 (1991). The Washington
Supreme Court is scheduled to rehear the case in late 1991.
,°5 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1359, 1361; see Seattle, Wash. City Ordinance 112425
(1985) under the authority of Seattle Landmark Preservation Ordinance 106348 (now SE-
AITLE MON. CODE 25.12).
3" First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1361.
"7 Id. at 1354.
3" Id. at 1355. The court noted that an uncontroverted affidavit estimated that the
landmark designation caused the value of the church property to decline from $700,000 to
$900,000. Id.
1°9 Id. at 1354. The church claimed tht the infringed religious freedoms included the
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In addressing the church's free exercise clahn, the court de-
clared that religious freedom should be viewed as having a pre-
ferred position relative to the state's interest in maintaining historic
landmarks."° The court stated that if a free exercise infringement
is found, it must subject the challenged legislation to strict scrutiny
analysis."' This requires the government to show a compelling
interest underlying its regulation and no feasible alternative for
accomplishing that goal." 2
The court stated that by requiring Board approval for any
proposed alterations to the church's facade, the landmark ordinance
effectively mandated secular approval of matters that were poten-
tially religious in nature." 3 The court held that this requirement
created an unjustified governmental interference in the religious
affairs of the church and therefore infringed the church's free
exercise rights." 14 The city argued that the landmark ordinance
contained special provisions, giving churches the final word on
alterations necessary for religious purposes, that were designed to
avoid infringement on religious freedom." 5 The court rejected this
argument, holding that these provisions were "vague and unwork-
able."516
The court ruled that even if the special provisions were not
excessively vague, they still would not free the ordinance from free
exercise infringement. 317 This was because, the court stated, these
provisions required that the Board be consulted on proposed
changes, which constituted an unjustified governmental interfer-
ability to alter the exterior of the church structure, the requirement of obtaining secular
approval of proposed changes, the effect of uncertainty stemming from the discretionary
nature of the approval, a resulting limitation on the church's ability to sell its property, and
the depreciation in value of that property. Id. at 1355.
313 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1356. The court first determined that the case was ripe
for adjudication, and then proceeded to the First Amendment analysis. Id.
'si Id. at 1357.
312 Id.
"3 Id. at 1359.
m Id. at 1360.
313 Id. at 1359-60. The ordinance provided that requirements "herein shall [not] prevent
any alteration of the exterior when such alterations are necessitated by changes in liturgy, it
being understood that the owner is the exclusive authority on liturgy and is the decisive
party in determining what architectural changes are appropriate to the liturgy." Seattle,
Wash. City Ordinance 112425 (1985). A later clause states that the church and the Board
"shall jointly explore such possible alternative design solutions as may be appropriate.., to
preserve the landmark." Id.
313 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1360.
919 Id.
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ence with religion." The court concluded that landmark preser-
vation laws are not a compelling state interest because they do not
protect public health and safety, but merely enhance aesthetic and
cultural features of the community. 3 ' 9 Absent such a compelling
interest, the court held that application of the Seattle landmark law
to the First Covenant Church violated the church's right to the free
exercise of religion. 32°
Two other opinions, one concurring and one dissenting, were
filed in First Covenant. First, Justice Utter concurred on the grounds
that application of the landmark law to the church building would
diminish significantly the economic value of the church's principal
asset. 32 ' Justice Utter argued that the Constitution protects the abil-
ity of a church to operate as an institution. 322 He reasoned that this
necessarily must be so because religious rituals, and their accesso-
ries, frequently are inseparable from actual faith. 323 Justice Utter
concluded, therefore, that to some extent the law must protect a
church's finances. 324
Justice Utter also proposed that the Washington Supreme
Court adopt the charitable purpose test. 325 He indicated that this
test's required showing of serious interference with a church's ex-
isting religious activity properly addresses the issue of a church's
functionality as an institution. 326 Justice Utter suggested that the
charitable purpose test is an appropriate standard for evaluating
free exercise challenges to land use controls. 327
Justice Dolliver dissented, stating that the liturgical exception
incorporated into the preservation ordinance was sufficient to avoid
any burden on the church's free exercise rights.'" Justice Dolliver
argued that, because the city had agreed to be bound to an inter-
pretation of the liturgical exception clauses favorable to religious
319 Id. The Board, however, still would have no power to prevent the church from
implementing its alterations. See id. at 1366 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
319 Id. at 1361. The court distinguished Penn Central by noting that the United States
Supreme Court had not explicitly said that landmark laws are a compelling state interest,
and that the plaintiff in Penn Central had not asserted the violation of a fundamental right
such as free exercise. Thus, the Supreme Court was not required to use strict scrutiny. Id.
520 Id. at 1361.
321 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1363 (Utter, J., concurring).
322 Id. at 1364 (Utter, J., concurring).
329 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 1365 (Utter, J., concurring).
326 Id.
327 Id.
508 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1366 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
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organizations, no free exercise violations actually were possible. 329
He asserted that merely requiring the church to consult with the
Board as to possible alternative designs was not a burden on the
church's religious freedom."° To characterize this requirement as
such a burden, Justice Dolliver stated, is to trivialize the significance
of First Amendment protections."'
Most cases involving free exercise claims against historic pre-
servation ordinances have addressed the effect of a landmark des-
ignation applied to the exterior of the particular structure. A fairly
recent development concerning historic preservation legislation has
been the controversy surrounding the designation of building in-
teriors. 332 Because most religious groups' services and rituals are
conducted primarily indoors, landmark designation of the internal
arrangements of churches may be more likely to infringe on actual
religious practice than similar external designations.
A case illustrating a free exercise challenge to a landmark des-
ignation as applied to the interior of church property is Society of
Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm4sion. 333 In December 1990, the Su-
preme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts held
that the landmark designation of the interior of the Church of the
Immaculate Conception violated the free exercise rights of the So-
ciety of Jesus ("the Jesuits"). 334 The Supreme Judicial Court based
its decision, however, on the Free Exercise Clause of the Massachu-
setts .Constitution. 335
The Church of the Immaculate Conception was built in Boston
between 1858 and 1861, and the beauty of its interior received
widespread recognition."° In 1986, the Jesuits began demolishing
the interior of the church, intending to convert the main (upper)
church into office and residence space and reserving the lower
5" Id.
552 Id.
" I Id.
"2 A small, but increasing, number of preservation ordinances allow landmark desig-
nation of the interiors of buildings. See, e.g., 1975 Mass. Acts 772, §1 4-5; D.C. Cone ANN.
5-1002 (1981). Some states, however, specifically proscribe interior designations in their
enabling legislation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-147f (West 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT.
160A-400.9 (1989), For an example of a case on this issue not involving free exercise
questions, see Weinberg v. Barry, 634 F. Supp. 86, 93 (D.D.C. 1986) (landmark designation
of the interior of a theatre does not facially violate the Takings Clause).
"5 564 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1990).
554 Id.
555 See infra note 356 for the text of this clause of the Massachusetts Constitution.
556 Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission, Nos. 87-3168, 87-4751, 87-
6586, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. I 1, 1989).
134	 BOSTON COI I.EGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:93
basement level for worship. 337 When the undertaking of these al-
terations became public knowledge, community sentiment sparked
a drive to have the interior of the church designated as a land-
mark.338 Soon thereafter, the Boston Landmarks Commission ("the
Commission") approved temporary landmark status for the church,
eventually making permanent the portion of the designation apply-
ing to the interior and exterior of the main church. 339 The Jesuits
filed three lawsuits against the Commission at different times: the
first to challenge the designation, a later suit to challenge the Com-
mission's denial of the Jesuits' application for a certificate of alter-
ation for the church, and a third challenging the Commission's
partial approval of a similar application that the Jesuits submitted. 34°
The three suits were consolidated and tried before the Suffolk
County Superior Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in
the fall of 1989. 34 '
In addressing the Jesuits' free exercise claim, the Suffolk
County Superior Court stated that the United States Constitution
protects a church from direct governmental interference with its
affairs.342 Citing Westchester for the principle that church buildings
are within the scope of this constitutional shield,343 the court noted
that the interior of a church is more likely to be tied closely to the
practice of religion than any other part of the building.344 There-
fore, the court determined that it was required to scrutinize closely
the application of the landmark ordinance to the Church of the
Immaculate Conception. 345
-	 The court held that the preservation statute's requirement of
Commission approval for any proposed alterations, with its atten-
dant administrative procedures, created a significant burden on the
Jesuits. 346 As an example of the burden the Jesuits faced, the court
335
 Id. at 1-2.
333
 Id. at 2.
3" Id.
34° Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 572. The Jesuits considered the partial approval of
their application unsatisfactory. See id.
3" Society of Jesus, Nos. 87-3168,87-4751,87-6586, slip op. at 3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 1989).
542 Id. at 4.
30 Id. at 4-5. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Westchester.
'" Id. at 5.
545 Id.
"6
 Society of Jesus, Nos. 87-3168,87-4751,87-6586, slip op. at 7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 1989).
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noted that the Jesuits believed that they would not be allowed to
remove the main altar from the upper church. 347 Although the
Commission indicated that it was willing to allow this alteration, the
court found that the Jesuits' perception of the landmark restriction
was enough to create an impact on their religious freedom."' The
court stated that this impact was dominating the administration of
the Church of the Immaculate Conception, and that the Jesuits'
ability to "run their church as they see fit" had been frustrated. 349
While conceding that historic preservation is worthwhile, the
court found that it is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify
the burdens placed on the Jesuits' practice of religion. 350 The court
pointed out the difference between abstract considerations concern-
ing the presence of free exercise infringements and the reality of
the practical effect of landmark status on the Jesuits' religious au-
tonomy."' In dicta, the court noted that landmark ordinances are
not the only way to pursue historic preservation goals." 2 The court
suggested that the state could pay for the preservation of the
church, either directly or through eminent domain. 353 Thus, the
Society of Jesus court held that historic preservation goals are not
sufficiently compelling to offset an infringement on the Jesuits' free
exercise of religion, and that therefore the Boston landmark statute
could not be applied to the interior of the Church of the Immaculate
Conception . 354
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the su-
perior court's Society of Jesus decision in December of 1990. 355 The
Supreme Judicial Court, however, based its decision entirely on the
provisions of article two of the Declaration of Rights of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, declining to reach any other constitutional
claims. 356 The court noted that, under the state constitution, pro-
"' Id. at 6.
543 Id. at 6-7.
543 Id.
553 Id. at 7.
3" Society of Jesus, Nos. 87-3168,87-4751,87-6586, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 1989).
552 Id.
553 Id.
354 Id.
355 Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 574.
566 Id. at 572-74. Article two of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Consti-
tution states, in relevant part:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or
estate, for worshipping COD in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments;
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tection of religious freedom has always been considered a broad,
uncompromising principle. 357
In addressing the application of the landmark statute to the
interior of the Church of the Immaculate Conception, the court
stated that the configuration of the church interior is so imbued
with religious meaning as to be inseparable from the Jesuits' reli-
gious worship. 358 The court went further, declaring that the right
to design interior spaces for religious worship, barring direct public
safety concerns, must be unhindered by any governmental regula-
tion. 359
 The court also noted that the "escape provisions" in article
two of the Massachusetts Constitution were not applicable to this
case. 360
Addressing the first "escape provision," the court stated that if
religiously motivated actions disturb the public peace, the accepta-
bility of a law regulating those actions must be evaluated by balanc-
ing the state interest in the regulation against the individual's inter-
est in his or her religious activity. 38 ' The reconfiguration of the
church interior, the court noted, neither disturbed the public peace
nor obstructed the religious worship of others, and therefore did
not require that the balancing test be applied. 382 The court also
observed that the state interest in historic preservation is not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify infringements on religious freedom,
and that the loss of culturally valuable church interiors is the price
that the state constitutional hierarchy exacts for providing funda-
mental protections. 383 Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court held that
the application of the Boston landmark statute to the interior of
the Church of the Immaculate Conception violated the Jesuits' free
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their
religious worship.
MASS. CoNsr. pt. 1, art. 11. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's conspicuous avoid-
ance of federal constitutional questions is noteworthy, especially in light of the fact that the
court decided the case several months after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Smith. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606
(1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause). See supra notes 133-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
357
 Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 573.
3" Id.
339 Id.
399 Id. at 573-74.
"I Id.
"3 Id.
3" Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 574.
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exercise of religion, as guaranteed by article two of the Declaration
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 364
At present, the ultimate effectiveness of First Amendment chal-
lenges to historic preservation ordinances is still unsettled. State and
federal courts have used the charitable purpose test and the United
States Supreme Court's most recent free exercise jurisprudence, as
enunciated in Smith, to uphold landmark laws against First Amend-
ment challenges.365 Prior to the recent shift in the Supreme Court's
approach to the Free Exercise Clause, some state courts had used
the First Amendment of the Constitution to bar the application of
preservation ordinances to both the interior and exterior of church
buildings. 366 Recently, however, a Massachusetts court has avoided
federal constitutional questions by using the free exercise provisions
of the state constitution to invalidate the application of a landmark
law to the interior of a church. 367
IV. ANALYSIS OF FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES IN THE HISTORIC
PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTIES
Public and private efforts toward historic preservation, though
underway in this country for well over a century, began to increase
significantly approximately thirty-five years ago. 366 Inevitably, this
expansion has given rise to legal challenges to the validity of laws
that allow the designation of particular properties as historic land-
marks. Traditionally, these challenges have taken the form of claims
by property owners that historic preservation ordinances violate the
Fifth Amendment by taking their property without just compen-
sation. 369 The United States Supreme Court, in rejecting such a
challenge in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, has
held that historic preservation ordinances do not violate the Takings
3" Id.
363 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354-55 (2d
Cir. 1990); Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 192 (N.Y. 1986).
mci See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1952, 1361 (Wash. 1990),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, Nos. 87-
3168, 87-4751, 87-6586, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 1989).
361 See, e.g., Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Mass.
1990).
300 See Duerksen & Bonderman, Preservation Law.- Where Its Been, Where It's Going, supra
note 18, at 1, 8.
3" See supra notes 45-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
takings challenges to historic preservation laws.
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Clause as long as they allow an owner a reasonable economic use
of his or her property. 37°
More recently, religious organizations have attacked landmark
designations of their property on First Amendment grounds, claim-
ing that the designations violate the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses."' The results of these challenges have been mixed
so far, and the issue has not yet been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court. The courts that have decided these cases have
struggled to find standards appropriate for determining the exis-
tence or permissible extent of any burden that historic preservation
ordinances place on churches' free exercise rights. 372
A. Analysis of First Amendment Standards
Judicial interpretation of the scope of free exercise protection
is the crucial element in the reSolution of First Amendment chal-
lenges to preservation ordinaikek Most courtS look to the First
Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme COurt when evaluating
the impact of landmark laws on free exercise rights. The Supreme
Court has distinguished between laws that directly target religion,
and are therefore inherently unconstitutiniial, and those that only
indirectly affect religious practices. 373 A hiitOrit preservation ordi-
nance, if found to affect religion at all, will normally fall in the
latter category. 374 Until recently, the Supreme Court based its free
exercise analysis on a form of strict scrutiny, first clearly enunciated
in Sherbert v. Verner, that required the government to show a com-
pelling interest in a challenged regulation to justify indirect burdens
on religion. 375 The Sherbert test, however, essentially has been dis-
carded by the Supreme Court, which now holds that neutral laws
of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 376
The implications of this recent standard, announced by Justice
Scalia in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
'7° 438 U.S. 104, 138 {1978). See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Penn Central.
371 See supra notes 232-367 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
First Amendment challenges to historic preservation ordinances.
372 See supra notes 250-367 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that illustrate
judicial approaches to the problems raised by preservation of religious buildings.
373 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1599 (1990).
374 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir.
1990).
373 See 374 U.S. 398, 403 {1963).
376 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
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are of major significance for historic preservation law. Historic pre-
servation ordinances are not intended to control or affect substan-
tive religious beliefs. 377 Under Smith, this makes short work of the
question as to whether they unconstitutionally abridge the free
exercise of religion. 578 Because the only free exercise burden that
landmark laws may impose is an indirect one, a court's analysis need
only focus on the character of the regulation and ask whether the
challenged law is applicable to non-religious parties in the same
position as a church.378 If this question is answered affirmatively,
the Smith analysis presumes that any incidental infringements on
religious liberty are not constitutionally cognizable.'"
The Smith test of general applicability, however, excessively
narrows the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. The clause now may
be invoked to protect religious freedoms only in two exceptional
situations: where a law directly coerces religious beliefs, or .where a
law infringes not only on religious exercise but on another consti-
tutionally guaranteed right as well."' As to the first instance, Justice
O'Connor correctly noted in her Smith concurrence that few legis-
latures will be so naive as to pass a law that specifically targets
religious observance. 382 Because the Supreme Court has stated that
the Equal Protection Clause already bars such legislation, this aspect
of the Free Exercise Clause is not its central function."'
Neither does the second situation, where "hybrid" constitu-
tional protections are involved, implicate the primary protections
of the Free Exercise Clause. Smith makes free exercise protection
almost completely contingent upon the presence of other constitu-
tional infractions. 384 Clearly, this cannot have been what the framers
of the First Amendment intended."' The cases cited by Justice
Scalia to demonstrate these hybrid situations do not support such
second-class treatment of the Free Exercise Clause. 388 Justice O'Con-
3" See SL Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354.
373 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600-01.
379 See id.
389 See id.
331 Id. at 1599,1601-02.
352 Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
333 Id. (citing Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,141-42 (1987)).
3" See id. at 1601-02.
333 Not only is it logical that each clause in the Constitution should be interpreted as
having its own individual purpose, it is also a fundamental precept of constitutional inter-
pretation that no clause is presumed to be without effect. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 . U.S. (1
Cranch) 137,174 (1803).
3" See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
•
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nor pointed out that those decisions "expressly relied" on free ex-
ercise jurisprudence, not an aggregation of constitutional claims. 387
The Smith "neutral, generally applicable" standard robs the Free
Exercise Clause of much of its vitality.
Justice Scalia stated in Smith that the Sherbert compelling interest
test effectively presumes invalid any legislation that affects religion,
unless the law is of extreme importance. 388 For a society as diverse
as that of the United States, he maintained, such a presumption
would lead to a disastrous circumvention of central governmental
authority.'" But under the Smith "neutral, generally applicable"
rule, the problem merely reverses itself: burdens on religion are
presumptively constitutional as long as they do not directly affect
religious beliefs or practices. 39° Justice Scalia attempted to discount
the potential harm such presumptions could cause by invoking the
political process as the mechanism for structuring societal values,
including the place of religion. 39 ' But this approach leaves protec-
tion of minority interests at the mercy of the majority, whose un-
sympathetic attitude at a given time may not properly reflect our
country's long-term social outlook. The First Amendment was en-
acted to avoid just this dilemma. 392 Justice Scalia's solution to the
problem of free exercise interpretation is to write the clause virtually
out of the Constitution.
At the other end of the spectrum is the Sherbert compelling
state interest test. 393 This standard requires the government to jus-
tify laws that infringe the free exercise of religion by demonstrating
a compelling interest in the goal underlying the regulation. 394 Sher-
bert's compelling interest test represents an expansive approach, in
which all incidental infringements on religious practice may be
subject to restraint. 395
Unlike the Smith test, which only demands that a particular law
be neutral and generally applicable, the Sherbert test requires a court
to look closely at the specific circumstances of each case. A state has
I" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'88 Id. at 1605.
389 Id.
390 See id. at 1601-02.
391 Id. at 1606.
392 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'9' See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sherbert.
'9' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963).
393 See id. at 406. Indeed, one form of constitutional analysis requires the use of strict
scrutiny for all infringements of "fundamental" rights, including, in the conventional view,
the free exercise of religion. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352,
1361 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 111  S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
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not needed to show a compelling interest, however, until a court
has determined that free exercise rights have been actually and
indirectly infringed. 396 If a court finds the burdened activity to be
of a secular nature, by definition no free exercise injury can have
occurred. 397 At the other extreme, if a particular law regulates
religious beliefs rather than religious practices, the burden on re-
ligion is direct and inherently unconstitutional." 8
Though the Sherbert test possibly accords the Free Exercise
Clause a more appropriate constitutional role than does the Smith
rule, it nonetheless stretches the scope of the clause. In her Smith
concurrence, Justice O'Connor pointed out that there is "nothing
talismanic" about neutral, generally applicable laws, as they can
coerce religious convictions as effectively as laws targeting reli-
gion.399 Similarly, however, there is nothing talismanic about a com-
pelling interest test that may unevenly assess competing social in-
terests. Where an infringed religious practice is considerably less
significant to its adherents than the infringing law is to society, the
compelling government interest test fails to yield an efficient distri-
bution of the burdens of social conflict. As demonstrated by the
example of historic preservation, the application of strict scrutiny
to all free exercise claims will overshoot the constitutional mark. A
standard that allows a more balanced approach to protecting con-
stitutional rights and accommodating important societal goals
should replace the Smith and Sherbert formulations.
Another important analytical tool for determining the legality
of religious landmarking, the charitable purpose test, was first de-
veloped in a takings context in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v.
Platt. 41" This specialized test states that any law that prevents or
seriously interferes with the carrying out of the charitable mission
of a non-profit property owner is unconstitutional."' This standard
was developed in the New York courts, and has been used by at
least one federal court for evaluating both free exercise and takings
challenges to landmark designations."'
9" Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
991 See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1983).
998 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
'99 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1612 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
0° 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div. 1968). See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Snug Harbor.
4°' Id.
4°2 See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 966-67
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The Snug Harbor charitable purpose test is perhaps a more
logically consistent method for evaluating the churches' claims than
the Supreme Court's current free exercise jurisprudence, which
relies on a "neutral, generally applicable" test. Originally developed
as a takings standard, the charitable purpose test is especially well-
suited to analyzing First Amendment actions based on the restric-
tion of property use. The definition that has emerged from Society
for Ethical Culture v. Spatt and Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v.
Barwick of "serious interference" with the carrying out of a group's
religious mission centers on the feasibility of continuing the present
religious activities in the existing facility. 40" This concept has its
genesis in Penn Central, where the Supreme Court sanctioned pre-
servation ordinances. 4" The Court acknowledged that the ordi-
nances would effectively "freeze" a structure in its present condi-
tion, leaving its owner only the existing use.'" Restricting judicial
inquiry to whether the present activities can be continued in the
existing building is a logically consistent extrapolation of the Penn
Central precedent.
The Barwick court correctly noted that, under the charitable
purpose test, the takings and free exercise criteria coincide in reli-
gious properties cases. 408 A landmark ordinance regulating a
church's use of its property has precisely the same economic effect
on the church as it does on a commercial property owner situated
similarly; it restricts the revenue that can be generated by a partic-
ular parcel of land.407 Such restriction is specifically allowed by Penn
Central.408 There is no taking under the charitable purpose test if
religious activities can continue uninterrupted—that is, the religious
mission can be carried out—in the existing building.409 Therefore,
if a church cannot prove that interference with its property rises to
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 192 (N.Y.
1986).
4°3 Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 192; Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922,
925-26 (N.Y. 1980).
404 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
405 See id. at 136.
406 Barwick, 496 N.E.2d at 191-92.
4 O7 See St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 966. One may presume that few churches would
claim that the accumulation of money is a religious exercise.
408 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131. Commercial owners are allowed a reasonable return,
not the most lucrative use of the property. The Free Exercise Clause does not seem to
require, as a deviation from this rule, that churches be allowed to capitalize on the most
lucrative use of their property.
109 See Ethical Culture, 415 N.E.2d at 925.
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the level of a compensable taking, it is difficult to see how such
interference will effect a curtailment of religious liberty. The. very
fact of continued religious observance in the existing facility dem-
onstrates that a landmark designation has not effected an uncon-
stitutional prohibition of religious exercise. Thus, if a historic pre-
servation ordinance does not seriously impede the carrying out of
a church's religious mission, the church will not suffer a constitu-
tionally cognizable infringement of religious freedotn. 41 °
Although the charitable purpose standard is somewhat less
"bright line" than the Smith test, it is still sufficiently definite to
permit uniform judicial application. Because the specific facts of
each case have larger significance under the charitable purpose test
than under Smith, singular circumstances are less likely to generate
unjust results. Despite Justice Scalia's objections to the contrary in
Smith, the relative assessment of conflicting interests is part of the
judiciary's traditional role. 4 " The charitable purpose test strikes an
appropriate balance between providing clear legal principles to
guide the judiciary and avoiding rigid, fact-blind legal rules.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the charitable
purpose test is an appropriate standard for evaluating the impact
of historic preservation legislation on the free exercise of religion.
This test is far better suited to the task than either the Supreme
Court's Smith or Sherbert Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. By
more evenly assessing the competing interests, the charitable pur-
pose test respects societal interest in preservation while protecting
the basic religious liberty of the organizations affected by land-
marking.
Landmark designation of religious properties may also impli-
cate Establishment Clause concerns. 4 t 2 The three-part Lemon test,
the basis for Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
mandates that laws have a secular purpose, secular primary effect,
and create no excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 4 "
Establishment Clause claims have not generated much discussion in
41° E.g., Harwich, 496 N.E.2d at 192.
4 " Employment Div., Dept of Human Resources v.Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 n.5
(1990). See Justice O'Connor's concurrence, advocating a judicial determination as to whether
any burden on a plaintiff is constitutionally significant. She noted that "[this] approach [is]
more consistent with [the] role [of] judges to decide each case on its individual merits." Id.
at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
412 See supra notes 168-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Establishment
Clause.
41 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
144	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 33:93
the cases thus far, being overshadowed by the free exercise contro-
versy.'" 4
The essence of churches' Establishment Clause claims is that
the statutory and judicial tests for granting exemption from land-
mark ordinances generally demand inquiry into the financial and
internal workings of the applicant for exemption. According to the
religious groups, this process involves excessive government entan-
glement in religious affairs 415 But as noted by the district court in
St. Bartholomew's, such inquiry is generally minimal.'" The more
persuasive Establishment Clause argument rests with the preserva-
tionists: allowing churches exemption from landmark laws would
constitute impermissible governmental sponsorship of religious ac-
tivity. Any entanglement burdens created through evaluating hard-
ship applications are far less constitutionally significant than the
strain placed on Establishment Clause principles by allowing
churches exemption from landmark laws. In the cases to date, the
Establishment Clause arguments have not attracted much judicial
interest and have been only a sidelight to the essential free exercise
dilemma. Frequent resolution of the free exercise question in favor
of religious organizations, however, eventually should provoke a
more heated argument of the Establishment Clause issue by the
preservationist camp.
B. Application of Free Exercise Standards in Recent Preservation Cases
The diversity of judicial response to free exercise challenges to
historic preservation ordinances is illustrated well by three recent
cases.4 ' 1 In St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a landmark ordinance by
applying the Smith standard, while framing much of its analysis in
the language of the charitable purpose test. 41 s Prior to the Smith
decision, a Massachusetts court used the Sherbert test to bar appli-
cation of a landmark ordinance to a church interior, and was af-
firmed by the state's highest court, post-Smith, on the basis of state
constitutional law. 419 The Washington Supreme Court, also prior to
Smith, used the Sherbert test to bar the application of a Seattle land-
414 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 963
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348, 356 n.4 (2d Cir. 1990).
416 See St. Bartholomew's, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
416 Id.
"7 See supra notes 263-364 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
4 " See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-56.
419 See Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, Nos. 87-3168, 87-4751, 87-
6586, slip op. at 4-8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 1989), aff'd, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1990).
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mark ordinance to a church. 42° The United States Supreme Court
has remanded this case and, as the Sherbert standard has now been
discarded, it is unclear how the Washington court will handle the
case. Each of these cases has involved a slightly different question
concerning the effect of a preservation ordinance on religious free-
dom.
In St. Bartholomew's, the issue was whether adverse economic
consequences resulting from the landmark designation of church
property violated the church's free exercise rights. 421 Specifically,
the question was whether St. Bartholomew's had property devel-
opment rights superior to those of commercial property owners
simply because it was a religious organization. The church's desire
to demolish the community house and construct a forty-seven story
office tower was completely incompatible with preservation goals. 422
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that the
church's revenue producing potential was significantly affected by
the landmark designation, the court correctly determined that no
free exercise violation had occurred. 425
The court arrived at this conclusion in an interesting way. First,
the court applied the Smith standard and ruled that the preservation
ordinance was neutral and generally applicable. 424 The church's
argument that the ordinance was discriminatory was weak and un-
supported by the facts. 425 The fact that church buildings often
receive landmark designations does not signal an intent to single
out religious structures for treatment different from that given
secular historic buildings. 426 The Landmarks Commission has some
power of discretion in deciding which structures to landmark, but,
as the court correctly noted, zoning has been carried out similarly
for many years and "passes constitutional muster."427
The court then used the language of the charitable purpose
test, stating that the church failed to prove that the preservation
ordinance prevented it from carrying out its religious mission in
4" See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352,1356-61 (Wash. 1990),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1990.
421 See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 353-54.
422 See id. at 352.
425
 Id. at 355-56.
424 See id. at 354-55.
425 See id. Churches make up approximately 15% of the number of landmarkcd buildings
in New York City. Id. at 354.
425 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-55.
427 Id. No challenge to landmarks laws, if based on discriminatory zoning arguments, is
likely to succeed in light of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978).
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the existing facilities. 428
 The court apparently was not satisfied with
a simple determination that the law was neutral and generally ap-
plicable. Though its discussion on the point was brief, the court
implied that a law imposing a financial burden severe enough to
threaten the continued existence of the church would be unconsti-
tutional.429
St. Bartholomew's filed an application for exemption under the
hardship provision of the New York City landmark ordinance,
which allows a property owner exemption from the ordinance if it
can demonstrate extreme physical or financial constraints'" The
decision of a landmarks commission to grant a church an exemption
from a preservation ordinance on hardship grounds is essentially a
tacit admission that the ordinance is seriously impeding the religious
function of the property owner. Because the church suffered no
restriction on its ability to continue its existing religious services,
the court properly agreed with the Landmarks Commission that
denial of the hardship application did not infringe the church's free
exercise rights."'
The interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause advocated by
the church is overly broad, as it would protect almost any activity
that the church desired to undertake:132 As the United States Su-
preme Court has pointed out, the language of the Constitution
specifically states that the free exercise of religion shall not be
prohibited.4" The Court thus made clear that the Constitution con-
siders that burdens on religion not reaching prohibitive levels are
potentially acceptable. 434 An appropriate interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause must recognize that some of the activities of reli-
gious organizations are more properly described as secular than
religious.
The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in St.
Bartholomew's was correct; the development of a commercial high-
rise, even if undertaken by a religious organization, cannot be
viewed as a religious exercise without overly expanding the scope
of the Free Exercise Clause. St. Bartholomew's suffered obvious
423 St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355.
1" See id. at 355-56.
43° Id. at 351-52. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of
hardship provisions.
"I See St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 354-56.
432 See id. at 353-54.
433 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,451 (1989).
474 See id.
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financial constraint, but clearly no religious coercion, in the indirect
impairment of its fundraising abilities.435 Absent such coercion, the
New York City landmark had no problem meeting the requirement
of being neutral and generally applicable. 436 As St. Bartholomew's
was able to continue religious observance in the existing facility, the
results reached under the charitable purpose and Smith standards
coincide.
It is unclear whether application of the Sherbert compelling
interest test would have yielded a different result in St. Bartholo-
mew's. As a threshold matter, the construction of a commercial office
tower is a secular, rather than religious, undertaking; it would not
have been necessary for the court to inquire further.437 The out-
come of the case could have been affected, however, if the court
had held that the construction project was part of the church's
religious practice, and that therefore the Free Exercise Clause was
implicated. Under a Sherbert analysis, the city would have prevailed
only if its interest in preservation was found "compelling."'" The
result of such an inquiry is uncertain, as few courts have ruled on
the question.'"
The Washington Supreme Court, however, has ruled that his-
toric preservation is not a compelling state interest. 440 The court
decided the case under the Sherbert test, as Washington has not
adopted the charitable purpose test and the case was decided pre-
Smith."' The court's majority opinion in First Covenant Church v. City
435 As the court carefully delineated, many other avenues of fundraising remain open
to the church. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 359-60.
'so Id. at 355-56. The court dismissed St. Bartholomew's Establishment Clause argument
rather summarily. Id. at 356 n.4. The Landmark Commission's simple inquiry into the
church's financial status, for the purpose of evaluating its hardship application, did not rise
to the level of unconstitutional governmental entanglement with religion. See id. The preser-
vation ordinance had both a secular purpose and primary effect, and the court found it
unnecessary even to mention these prongs of the Lemon test. See id, Because the inquiry into
the church's finances was of a routine, record-keeping nature, the Establishment Clause claim
was appropriately dismissed. See id.
437 Cf. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1983) (construction of a church building held to be a secular
activity).
433 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
433 Compare First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1356-61 (Wash,
1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991) (state court held that historic preservation is not a
compelling state interest) with Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
107-08 (1983) (historic preservation is an important tool for promoting general public
welfare). Penn Central, however, did not involve a First Amendment challenge to the landmark
law and did not specifically decide the compelling interest question.
1140 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1356-61.
411 Justice Utter, however, urged in his concurrence that the court adopt the charitable
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of Seattle is rather extreme, and clearly shows how the compelling
interest test can generate unbalanced results.
The court's discussion of the state interest in historic preser-
vation was brief. 442 The court concluded that landmark laws regu-
late only the aesthetic features of a community, and do not contrib-
ute to the health and safety of its citizens. 443 The court's implicit
assumption that preservation goals are simply cosmetic measures is
incorrect. This assumption ignores the practical, if not instantly
tangible, impact that historic preservation has on the development
of society. 444
It should have been unnecessary, however, for the court to
reach the issue of whether the state interest in historic preservation
was sufficiently compelling to justify the landmark ordinance, as
there first must have been a cognizable encroachment on religious
liberty. First Covenant Church sought a declaratory judgment bar-
ring application of the landmark law to its property, but did not
claim that the ordinance was hindering any specific religious pur-
suits.445 In addition, the Seattle preservation ordinance specifically
provided that the church retain absolute power to make any struc-
tural changes to its building that were necessitated by liturgical
concerns. The ordinance further provided that the church be the
sole authority on liturgy and the decisive party concerning the
architectural changes that could be undertaken. These provisions
made the ordinance a virtual nullity, requiring only that the church
consult with the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Board before pro-
ceeding with any alterations. 446
In adopting such an ordinance, the city essentially denied itself
the ability to unconstitutionally infringe the church's free exercise
rights. If, as the court said, the liturgy provision was overly vague,
this vagueness could only benefit the church's complete authority
to make "liturgical" changes. 447 The burdens that the landmark
ordinance placed on the church appeared to be minor and quite
reasonable: a modest amount of paperwork, and the necessity of
informing the Board, which had no power to block the plans in any
purpose test for evaluating free exercise claims lodged against landmark laws. Id. at 1365
(Utter, J., concurring).
442 See id. at 1361.
"3 Id.
444 See Stipe, supra note 22, at 211-13.
"5 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1354,
446 See supra note 315 for a discussion of this ordinance.
"7 See First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1360.
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event, of proposed structural alterations. 448 It is remarkable how
little weight the court accorded the efforts of the preservation board
to avoid violating the church's religious autonomy. 449 Although the
church claimed that any application of the ordinance to its property
was unconstitutional, these ordinance provisions seemed a positive
attempt to find compromise solutions and establish a dialogue be-
tween the preservation board and the church. 45°
In holding that the preservation ordinance violated the
church's free exercise rights, even in the absence of specific injury,
the court essentially ruled that any application of landmark law to
religious properties is facially unconstitutional. 4" This result is an
egregious overextension of the Free Exercise Clause, and is entirely
inconsistent with the view most courts have taken in cases involving
land use controls applied to religious properties. 452 As Justice Dol-
liver pointed out in his dissent, the majority's holding "trivializes"
the significance of First Amendment protections. 453 The court failed
to recognize that some church actions are of a secular nature, and
extended free exercise protection to potential restrictions upon
these secular undertakings. This total, blanket exemption from the
landmark law solely for religious organizations constitutes a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 454 The Washington Supreme
Court's extreme interpretation of the First Amendment yielded an
improper result in this case.
In his concurrence, Justice Utter suggested a more credible
basis for finding a free exercise encroachment than that offered by
the majority.455 He concluded that First Covenant's constitutional
rights had been violated because the preservation ordinance caused
a significant decrease in the value of the church's property. 456 First
Covenant, however, did not claim that it desired to sell or otherwise
change its interest in the property.457 Therefore, it had not realized
any direct financial loss from this diminution, and its claims were
"8 See id. at 1359-61.
"9 See id.
450. Id. at 1355.
431 See id. at 1356-61.
432 See supra notes 202-367 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
land use controls and the First Amendment. None of these cases that held the application
of land use controls to religious properties is inherently unconstitutional.
453 First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1366 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
434 See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890,897 (1989).
433 See First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1363 (Utter, J., concurring).
456 Id,
"I See id. at 1354.
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premature. 458 Even if the church had been critically affected finan-
cially, it should have been required to show that the impact of the
decrease in property value seriously impaired the church's contin-
ued operation. Justice Utter was correct, however, in stating that
the court should require a very specific showing of economic diffi-
culty before ordering an exemption from land use restrictions. 459
An actual threat to religious worship should have been present
before the court invoked First Amendment protections.
Analysis of the facts of this case under both the Smith rule and
the charitable purpose test will yield a different result than that
reached by the Washington Supreme Court. Under Smith, which
was announced some three months after First Covenant, the church's
claims would have been dismissed. 46° The preservation ordinance
was neutral and generally applicable; therefore, First Covenant
would have been required to comply with it even in light of an
indirect burden on the church's free exercise rights.
The charitable purpose test would be similarly uncharitable to
the church's claims. 46 ' In his concurrence, Justice Utter indicated
that the charitable purpose test would yield a result in accordance
with the majority opinion,462 but this is a misreading of the New
York cases. Justice Utter failed to correctly apply the test's require-
ment that a church make a showing that it is prevented or seriously
impeded in carrying out its religious purpose in the existing facility.
First Covenant failed to make this showing; therefore, its claims
would not prevail under the charitable purpose standard.
The United States Supreme Court has remanded First Covenant
to the Washington Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
the holding of Smith. 463 The Supreme Court's decision makes clear
that the Washington court, if it continues to apply federal consti-
tutional law, will have no choice but to uphold the application of
the historic preservation ordinance to the First Covenant Church.
The Washington court, however, may decide the case on the basis
466 The court concluded that the church's claims were ripe because the church had
failed to get the landmark designation lifted through administrative procedures. See id. at
1356.
436 Id. at 1364 (Utter, J., concurring).
466 Smith requires any law that burdens free exercise rights to be neutral and generally
applicable. See 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
46, See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the charitable
purpose test.
462 See First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1365 (Utter, J., concurring).
463 City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, Ill S. Ct. 1097 (1991). See supra notes
133-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
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of the religious freedom section of the state constitution. 4" The
state court then would be free to use the compelling interest test to
affirm its previous ruling barring application of the Seattle land-
mark law to church property. 465
The interior arrangements of churches often are closely tied
to actual religious observance, and consequently a more palpable
danger exists that landmarking will result in restrictions on religious
liberty. A Massachusetts case, Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Commission, involved just this question.466 Both the trial court and
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the landmark
designation of the interior of the Church of the Immaculate Con-
ception violated the religious liberty of the Society of Jesus ("the
Jesuits"). 467 In the interval between the two decisions, however, the
United States Supreme Court announced Smith. 468 The Supreme
Court's holding in that case may have influenced the Supreme
Judicial Court's choice of grounds for affirming the lower court,
which had based its holding on federal constitutional law.469
In the original trial, the Suffolk County Superior Court used a
Sherbert analysis to conclude that the city's interest in preservation
was not compelling, and could not justify the landmark designa-
tion's encroachment on the Jesuits' religious freedom.'" The court
464 Article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution states, in part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested
or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
WASH. CONST. art. I, 11.
466 A similar situation already has occurred in one other state. Prior to Smith, the
Minnesota Supreme Court used the federal compelling interest test to bar the application of
a state traffic law to the vehicles of the Amish religious sect. See State v. Hershberger, 444
N.W.2d 282, 287-90 (Minn. 1989). The Minnesota court said that it was reserving consid-
eration of the issue under state constitutional law until "a later date in a different case," Id.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, post-Smith, Minnesota decided that the
"later date" had come, and used the state constitution to achieve the same result as its prior
decision. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-99 (Minn. 1990).
466 Nos. 87-3168, 87-4751, 87-6586, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 1989), aff 'd,
564 N.E.2d 571, 572-74 (Mass. 1990). See supra notes 333-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Society of Jesus.
467 Id.
466 See 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). The trial and appellate decisions in Society of Jesus were
released, respectively, on October 11, 1989 and December 31, 1990. Smith was decided on
April 17, 1990.
469 See Society of Jesus, Nos. 87-3168, 87-4751, 87-6586, slip op. at 4-8 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. II, 1989).
47° See id.
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stated that the constitutional protection of religion extends to the
buildings used for worship, and therefore particularly to the inte-
rior of those buildings. 4" The court's finding as to the burden
suffered by the church, however, actually seems to have centered
on the effect that certain administrative procedures, which were
required to obtain exemption from the landmark ordinance, had
on the church's construction plans. 472
This basis for the decision implicitly assumed the answer to a
threshold issue that the court should have specifically examined.
The proper inquiry would have been whether the proposed alter-
ations that the Jesuits sought for the church building were man-
dated by liturgical practices or were actually secular. If the altera-
tions were not directly connected to religious practice, the
administrative procedures imposed by the landmark ordinance
would not have been unconstitutionally burdensome; if they were
mandated by religious practice, then the court should have contin-
ued its analysis to determine whether restrictions imposed by the
landmark ordinance would be permissible.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court on the
basis of provisions in the Massachusetts Constitution that guarantee
religious liberty. 473 Although the court stated that historic preser-
vation is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify infringe-
ments on religious freedom, it did not actually analyze the conflict
from a Sherbert perspective. 474 Instead, the court's analysis relied
solely on its interpretation of the protections provided by the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution. 475 The United States Supreme Court had
announced the Smith standard some months before the appellate
decision in Society °fiesta, so the Sherbert test was no longer available
to the Supreme Judicial Court. 476 Under the Smith standard of
neutral, general applicability, historic preservation ordinances that
protect interiors will fare no worse than those that protect exteriors
alone.477 The burdens created by generally applicable laws will re-
main indirect and non-discriminatory as long as such laws also may
be applied to the interiors of non-religious buildings. 478 Under
471 Id. at 4-5.
m Id. at 5-7.
"3 Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 579.
4" Id. at 572-74.
Id.
473 See supra notes 133-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
.173 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600
(1990).
"3 See id.
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Smith, therefore, the landmark designation would have been up-
held.
Few courts, including state courts, have based their decisions
concerning religious freedom challenges to land use controls on
state constitutional law. 479 The Supreme Judicial Court's reliance on
the Massachusetts Constitution seems to signal its disagreement with
Smith. If the Smith decision survives, it appears likely to have a
steadily decreasing influence in cases determining the permissibility
of landmark designations of religious properties. 48°
Under the charitable purpose test, the landmark designation
of the church interior may have been allowed to stand, but the
question would have been much closer than under Smith or the state
constitution."' Although the church was not required to make a
showing concerning its financial health, as Massachusetts has not
adopted the charitable purpose standard, the ability of the church
to continue its religious services in the existing facility appears to
have been understood. 482 Moreover, the construction of office and
residential quarters should be considered a secular activity, even in
a church building. 983 The remodeling of the church interior appears
to have been motivated more by financial than ecclesiastical con-
cerns, and, as a result, is not entirely distinguishable from the
development of an office tower. 484
A notable difference in this case, however, is that the Jesuits
were not contemplating lease or sale of the renovated church space
to commercial, non-religious parties."' Although this fact does not
alter the final result under the charitable purpose test in this case,
it does suggest that landmarking church interiors is especially prob-
lematic. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which signif-
475 See supra notes 202-364 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major cases
involving land use controls challenged on religious grounds.
480 There has been widespread alarm over the impact that the Smith decision may have
on religious freedom. A coalition of politically diverse groups is currently attempting to have
the Smith holding overruled legislatively. See Ethan Bronner, Court's Curb on Religion Draws
Fire, BOSTON GLOBE,t Jan. 6, 1991 at 2.
481 See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the charitable
purpose test.
452 See Society of Jesus, Nos. 87-3168, 87-4751, 87-6586, slip op. at 1-3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. II, 1989).
455 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351-53 (2d
Cir. 1990). See supra notes 263-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of St. Bartholo-
mew's.
454 See Society of Jesus, Nos. 87-3168, 87-4751, 87-6586, slip op. at 1-2 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. I1, 1989).
455 Id.
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icant restrictions on religious freedom would be created by interior
landmarking. For this reason, preservation ordinances that allow
designation of church interiors should be drafted carefully, with an
eye toward avoiding free exercise infringements. 486 Additionally,
the proper standard for evaluating the landmarking of religious
properties, the charitable purpose test, should be applied in a more
liberal fashion in cases concerning interior landmark designations.
Such measures should ensure that sensitive religious concerns are
properly respected.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of historic preservation ordinances to religious
buildings has been, and will remain, a difficult problem. The parties
on both sides of the issue are entrenched and, as the conflicting
judicial results illustrate, the inability of the courts to find a satis-
factory consensus on how to evaluate each case only exacerbates the
problem. The central dilemma is how to interpret and apply the
Free Exercise Clause; Courts must maintain, but not exaggerate,
the Constitution's.unquestionably important protection of religious
freedom. The traditional broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause,
requiring compelling justification for every governmental encroach-
ment, has given way to a new narrow interpretation that endows
legislative, action ,with a powerful presumption of validity. Both
approacl}es,have, major flaws that, when evaluating the constitution-
ality of . landmark: designations, may produce distorted results.
The. best standard for evaluating First Amendment challenges
to preservation laws, is the "charitable purpose" test. This test re-
quires the party ,challenging a landmark law to show that it can no
longer physically or financially continue its religious activities in the
existing facility., Although this test has never been used by the
Suprenie -Court,- it has been applied successfully by both federal
and state courts. The charitable purpose test best achieves a proper
balance between protecting important religious freedoms and pre-
serving the cultural integrity and historic legacy of this country.
STEVEN P. EAKMAN
"el Provisions similar to those of the Seattle ordinance that was challenged in First
Covenant could strike a proper balance. See supra notes 303-31 and accompanying text for
a discussion of First Covenant and the Seattle ordinance.
